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Abstract 
This study deals with the impact of EU’s regional policy and the pre-accession funds on 
the regional policies of the Czech Republic in the period leading up to the enlargement 
of the Union in 2004. More specifically we trace the major influences on the changes 
occurring in the regional policies of the Czech Republic through the country’s 
preparations for membership, from 1990 and up until the Czech membership was 
approved in the late 2002. Drawing on new-institutionalist theories we make an attempt 
to asses the impact of Europeanization on the domestic policies, which will also 
eventually affect the domestic institutional governance structures. The conclusion is that 
Europeanization has been a major driving force behind the changes in Czech regional 
policies. Even though, major reforms was met by fierce domestic opposition in the 
initial face, the EU requirements managed to change the preferences of national actors 
and to create new opportunities for them to exploit, which eventually proved to be 
sufficient to overcome the resistance to the decentralisation that was required by the EU. 
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1 Area of research 
The main concern of EU’s regional policies has, during the last two decades, been 
to reduce the divergence between member states. Even though, the European 
integration processes has led to some convergence in various areas, the member 
states remain very different with regards to their e.g. economic capacities. These 
disparities can be found between regions within the member states. It is evident 
that countries and regions have very different starting points and have been 
affected differently by processes of industrialization, economic integration, 
globalisation etc. These regional disparities are even greater in the enlarged EU of 
25 members. The EU has tried to target the future economic gaps between 
Europe’s regions by initiating the pre-accession policies. These were aimed at 
improving the structures of the poorest regions of the CEECs (Central and Eastern 
European Countries) and increasing their economic prospects of surviving the 
challenges of the internal market. The overall purpose of the EU regional policy is 
to reduce disparities and promote greater economic and social cohesion across the 
EU (Commission 2005). 
 
EU’s regional policy towards the candidate states of the 2004 enlargement 
basically had two aspects: first of all, the candidates had to implement the entire 
Acquis Communautaire - the full body of obligations deriving from the EU 
legislation agreements. The CEECs’ ability to comply with the formal 
requirements for accession outlined in the Copenhagen Criteria was evaluated by 
the Commission in regular reports from 1997 onwards. Among the criteria for 
membership were also special requirements to the regional policies of the 
candidates, which were evaluated alongside the other requirements in the reports. 
The structure of the reports changes slightly over the years, but in 2000 the 
regional policy finally ended up in chapter no. 21, which basically emphasised 
that a candidate needed to have the capacity to implement EU’s regional policy 
upon accession to the Union, and if this capacity did not exist it was required to 
build it up before the Commission could recommend its accession. What this 
requirement exactly meant and what the implications were for the candidates we 
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will take up and discuss below. The second aspect is interconnected with the first; 
it consists of the pre-accession funds, which financially assisted the candidates in 
implementing the Acquis, and helped them prepare for structural and cohesion 
funding, which represent a greater part of EU’s regional policy. The EU’s 
Regional Policy takes up around 1/3 of the total EU budget or around 0,45 % of 
the EU’s total GDP, thus making it the second largest item on the budget only 
exceeded by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Allen 2005; 214f.). This 
illustrates the political importance attached to the objectives of reducing regional 
disparities and the importance that is generally attached to the regional policy. 
Due to the prospects of immense economic differences between the regions of an 
enlarged EU, the EU acknowledged that something had to be done before the big 
bang enlargement took effect. The pre-accession funds were designed to help this 
transition, but they were only of moderate proportions (Hughes et al. 2004). 
However, they still represented the largest foreign aid channelled into Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE). (Grabbe 2003: 314). A central aspect of the funds was the 
conditions attached that the candidates had to comply with. E.g. the co-funding or 
additionality criteria potentially affected governments’ economic priorities, and 
the partnership principle has especially been held to have major repercussions for 
the regional territorial organisations of a country and also on political priorities.  
 
After the fall of communism in CEE, most of the former communist countries 
have gone through a period of transition and change. Especially in the case of the 
Czech Republic, who had very little in the way of regional policy and thus almost 
started from scratch in 1989. The shift from totalitarianism to democracy and from 
central planning to market economy did not happen overnight. E.g. the Czech 
Republic which has had long traditions for a strong centralized government, has 
experienced a gradual decentralization, starting in 1993 with the Velvet Divorce 
when Czechoslovakia was dissolved (Baun 2002: 267). The Czech constitution 
following the 1992 break up with Slovakia, provided for the establishment of 
regional administrative units between the municipal level and the central 
government, however it took almost ten years before these regions were actually 
established and vested with any competences. There appears to have been a 
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mismatch between the objectives and the actions of the Czech Republic; despite 
that membership was a high priority goal, reform processes has happened very 
slowly. Hence, there seems to have been strong domestic forces reluctant to 
engage in processes of decentralisation, and it took e.g. a 1997 “Constitutional Act 
on the Formation of the Regions” and a change in government – before regional 
self-administration with democratically elected councils could be established. The 
new regional authorities began functioning from January 2001, and they were 
viewed as future central partners of the national government and the European 
Commission in the planning and implementation of the EU’s regional policy. 
(Baun 2002)  
 
The popular view on the post communist transition in the CEECs is that the EU 
was the primal instigator of reforms. While it is beyond reasonable doubt that EU 
has been involved in internal affairs of the candidate states, the extent to which the 
changes can be credited to the influence of EU requirements is a more blurred 
matter. It seems as if national and EU actors had strong incentives to emphasise 
the role of the EU. But, whether the changes at domestic level would have taken 
place without the interference of the EU is difficult to measure. Exploring this 
very broad issue is a part of the Europeanization research agenda, which from 
many different ontological and epistemological starting points attempts to asses 
the impact of the EU on member states, candidate states, neighbourhood states 
and even countries outside direct EU influence. 
 
It is the ambition of this report, by studying the roles of domestic (e.g. actors and 
institutions) and EU factors (e.g. the regional policy requirements), to ascertain 
the most important factors for the changes in the Czech Republic’s regional 
policy.  
1.1 Cardinal Question 
Thus we have arrived at the following research question, which will guide our 
analysis. 
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How has the regional policies in the Czech Republic been affected by 
Europeanization and to what extent have domestic factors mediated the 
outcome of the transformation processes? 
 
This cardinal question is basically derived from our methodological choices and 
our theoretical considerations which we will elaborate further on below. Our 
research evolving around this question lies within the issue area of the Master 
Studies of Public Administration (Forvaltning), because it leads us to apply and 
discuss multiple theories and methods from social sciences, deriving from many 
different disciplines, e.g. political science, sociology, law and economics, of 
course our main focus will be on the perspective of political science, but in 
keeping with the trans-disciplinary tradition of our university we do not limit 
ourselves by disciplinary demarcations, rather we are limited by the empirical 
reality that we try to study. 
 
The cardinal question calls for an analysis of factors at the EU and the domestic 
level. How we intend to explore this question will be outlined in chapter 2, 
following a few practical considerations. 
1.2 Delimitation 
We focus on the regional policy for several reasons. First, it is a very important 
policy which consumes around 1/3 of the EU-budget. Secondly, the Czech 
Republic’s regional policy was almost non-existent after the collapse of 
communism indicating a high level of misfit between EU-requirements and 
domestic level, which is a concept we will come back to later. This is one of the 
reasons for our choice of case, as it implies that there has been a significant 
change in the regional policy, thus making it easier for us to account for actual 
changes. Furthermore, the Czech Republic was the first candidate state to close 
the chapter on regional policy with the EU, six months before the rest of the 
CEECs, which indicates that the Czech Republic had been experiencing a high 
degree of change in relation to EU demands. The time period from the collapse of 
communism in 1989 until the approval of EU membership in 2002 will be our 
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main focus. It was during this time span of 11-12 years that the Czech regional 
policy and the EU’s regional policy requirements of the pre-accession fund 
developed. We have chosen this time period because it presents a period of 
important domestic change, and intensive EU-activities in relation to the CEECs. 
1.3 Source criticism 
We will try to encapsulate the theories of Europeanization and EU regional policy 
by 2using widely acknowledged scholars, and not only by using official EU 
documents. We will try to assess the scholars’ theoretical backgrounds and 
methodological differences in an attempt to grasp a fuller picture of the field of 
research and theoretical schools. By doing this we will try to minimize the risk of 
pre-valuation of any factors – domestic nor EU. We use a large amount of 
documents from either official EU or Czech government sources; these are to a 
large degree coloured by their authors and the institutions they represent. We are 
aware of this fact and we do not rely on these documents without taking their 
intention into consideration, but we use these in combination with scientific 
research on the issue to shed the most nuanced light on the subject matter. 
 
Although we have not collected our own first hand empirical data through 
interviews or other research we do consider our empirical foundation to be 
consistent and valid because of our careful screening, and because we combine 
our analysis with other scholars’ research in the field of Europeanization and 
study of the changes in regional policies of the Czech Republic and other CEECs. 
But, we do not see complications in these premises, as long as we are conscious 
about what we are drawing on other scholars and the material from the 
Commissions. This does not make our analysis and conclusion less valid as long 
as we make our conclusive foundation absolutely clear, which is what we have 
tried to de here. 
1.4 The design of the report 
Following this brief introduction to our case and some considerations on some 
practical and methodological issues we will proceed to introduce our choice of 
theories and methodology for studying Europeanization in chapter 2. Where we 
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will also elaborate on a historical institutionalist perspective that can help us 
account for processes of change. This leads to our research strategy, which will be 
presented at the end of the chapter. In chapter 3 we analyze the developments of 
Czech regional policies since the fall of communism. In chapter 4 we account for 
the most important aspects of EU’s Regional Policy, which might have affected 
the Czech policy choices, while in chapter 5 we conclude on our findings and try 
to draw parallels to future processes of enlargement and the regional policies of 
the EU. 
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2 Theoretical and methodological considerations on 
Europeanization and institutional change 
In this chapter we will propose a theoretical and analytical framework for 
analysing the changes that has happened in the Czech Republic’s regional policies 
since the collapse of communism. Drawing on a bottom-up approach to the study 
of Europeanization combined with new-institutionalist theory, we will try to 
explain why and how these changes have happened and what have been the main 
factors driving the changes. On that basis we can analytically establish what the 
role of the European Union has been in the Czech Republic’s transformation of 
regional policies.  
2.1 Europeanization 
Europeanization is a research topic, which has been in continuous development. 
Especially during the last ten years or so the study of Europeanization has 
witnessed what can be described as a veritable boom. The concept has however 
been applied to the study of many different empirical phenomena by social 
scientists from very different traditions and disciplines, thus ascribing many 
different meanings to the concept as either an analytical tool or as an empirical 
phenomenon. As Featherstone (2003) demonstrates the concept has been used for 
describing both the export of cultural norms and patterns and especially intra-
European diffusion of cultural norms, ideas and identities. Today however it is 
more often applied to explain domestic institutional or political adjustment to 
pressures and influences from the EU. (Featherstone 2003: 5-12) We will focus on 
the latter application of the concept and below we will refine our understanding of 
the concept Europeanization. 
 
Compared to theories of European integration, which traditionally is used in the 
study of the European Union, the study of Europeanization-processes is post-
ontological. The ambition is not to account for the exact nature of the EU, rather 
the EU is assumed to be a political system of a more or less well-defined 
configuration, and the focus is on processes and outcomes of the political 
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processes (Featherstone 2003: 4). Radaelli defines this as a major strength of the 
Europeanization research agenda, because it brings the study of the EU back into 
the spheres of “‘normal’ political science” (Radaelli 2003: 28 and Radaelli 2004: 
3). Hence Radaelli advocates that an Europeanization study can be performed 
perfectly well by applying theories and methodologies known from comparative 
policy analysis (Radaelli 2003: 28). Hence, as Featherstone (2003: 12) points out, 
Europeanization is not a stand alone theoretical framework; rather it is combined 
with other meta-theoretical frameworks e.g. new-institutionalism. 
“Europeanization should be seen as a problem, not a solution”, (Radaelli 2004: 
2) hence, it cannot be seen as an explanatory apparatus in its own right, as it does 
not provide any answers to emprirical or theoretical problems. It is a question or a 
set of questions waiting for an explanation rather than the explanation in itself.  In 
relation to this Radaelli also points out that the important thing is not to come up 
with the right answers, it is actually to ask the right questions, and in this direction 
Europeanization is indeed useful (Radaelli 2004: 2). Europeanization needs a link 
to other theories in order to explain the processes at work; this is what we will try 
to do below, after defining our use of the concept of Europeanization. For more 
comprehensive overviews and discussions of the merits of the literature on 
Europeanization see e.g. Radaelli (2004), Featherstone (2003), Lenschow (2006) 
and Olsen (2002). 
2.1.1 Definitions 
As shortly touched upon the concept of Europeanization has been used in many 
different ways, and has been linked with many different meanings by scholars. 
We will primarily view the concept as it is applied by political scientists although 
spanning a huge diversity in the definitions of the concept. This in part can be 
ascribed to the different ontological and epistemological assumptions of the 
scholars, meaning that there are differences regarding the perceived directions of 
what one might call policy influences, and there is also divergence in the methods 
that scholars recommend using in the study of Europeanization-processes. In the 
subsequent we will narrow down the use of Europeanization as it pertains to our 
project. 
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We could spend a vast amount of pages discussing different definitions of 
Europeanization. E.g. Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso (2000) draw lines back to 
studies of European Integration, by defining Europeanization as “[…] the 
emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance“ (Risse, Cowles, and Caporaso 2000: 3). While Börzel narrows down 
the focus to a “[…] process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly 
subject to European policy-making” (1999: 574), and thereby claim that the 
European dimension penetrates the national spheres of politics and policy (Radelli 
2003: 29). We have chosen to stick to a definition, proposed by Claudio M. 
Radaelli, who has developed his conception on the background of a long range of 
studies of Europeanization processes. He defines Europeanization as: 
 
[…] processes of a) construction, b) diffusion, and c) institutionalization of 
norms, beliefs, formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 
‘ways of doing things’ that are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy 
processes and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-
national) discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies. 
(Radaelli and Pasquier 2006: 8)1 
 
Contrary to Börzel Radaelli outline the specific domains and mechanisms of 
Europeanization while he also focuses on the domestic impacts of EU influences. 
By specifying what Europeanization processes cover he helps us narrowing our 
focus, and through our analysis we will be able to isolate Europeanization from 
other influences at work in our specific case. In this respect, compared to e.g. 
Börzel’s definition, which nearly tries to catch-all and thereby ends up not 
catching anything specific, Radaelli’s definition is superior. Furthermore this 
definition is broad enough to capture some general trends, making it fit for 
application to the research of Europeanization in almost any policy field, and in 
almost any country regardless of whether they are member of the EU or not. 
 
                                                 
1 In earlier publications by Radaelli (e.g. 2003: 30 and 2004: 3) he uses a slightly different 
wording, even though the intention and extension of his concept remains the same. 
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Another striking feature about this definition is that it has a strict focus on 
Europeanization as process rather than an end state (Radaelli 2004: 5). Secondly 
the processes are described as quite dynamic, thus it accounts for policy 
influences going in different directions. As Grabbe points out; 
 
[t]his definition stresses the importance of change in the logic of political 
behaviour, which is a useful way of distinguishing Europeanization effects from 
the many other processes of change at work in the post-communist political 
context.  
(Grabbe 2003: 309)  
 
According to Radaelli, it would be a misunderstanding to claim that this definition 
focuses only on the impact of EU-decisions on domestic structures. Another 
misunderstanding would be to believe that everything that goes on in Brussels is a 
case of Europeanization (Radaelli and Pasquier 2006: 8). 
 
Grabbe (2003) adopts the same definition in her discussion of the relevance of 
studying Europeanization in the candidate states2. Her point is that it is definitely 
relevant to apply the same definition to these cases, but it should be noted that 
Europeanization is e.g. not a theory about EU-enlargement, just like Radaelli 
pointed out that it is not a theory about European integration. However by 
studying Europeanization in connection to enlargement processes, we might get 
useful insights in the dynamics of EU-enlargement (Grabbe 2003: 310). 
2.1.2 Research design in the study of Europeanization 
There are different methods to study Europeanization processes; the two basic 
models are most often described as top-down and bottom-up research designs3. 
The notions of top-down and bottom-up refers strictly to the analytical and 
epistemological choice, not per se to the ontological assumptions on the nature of 
Europeanization processes, even though both might affect the other. In this section 
                                                 
2 Note that Grabbe‘s article is from 2003 the year before the enlargement, thus what we sometimes 
refer to as the new member states, was back then quite naturally referred to as the candidate states. 
3 For another approach to Europeanization study which has a research design falling outside the 
narrow  top-down and bottom-up categories, see Kassim (2003) 
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we will shortly present some central features of the two approaches and qualify 
our choice of the bottom-up perspective in our study. 
 
The top-down or baseline approach, as referred to by Radaelli and Pasquier 
(2006), starts from the EU-level detecting a specific integration process leading to 
the adoption of some kind of EU-policy, which has to be implemented in the 
member states. The central assumption is that there has to be some kind of misfit 
between EU-requirements and national structures in order for the EU to create 
adaptational pressures for a member state. Börzel and Risse (2003), who are 
advocates of a top-down approach, distinguish between policy misfit and 
institutional misfit. In reality it can be extremely difficult to distinguish between 
these two types of misfit, e.g. because an institutional misfit most likely will have 
policy implications, and policies will often also have institutional implications. 
Thus in our case we will not focus very much on this distinction, but imminently 
we focus on policy under the assumption that policies might indeed also have 
institutional impacts. The basic assumption of the misfit or goodness of fit thesis is 
that a certain degree of misfit is needed to generate the adaptational pressure that 
is needed for EU-requirements to induce changes in domestic policies, politics or 
polities. Too big a misfit leading to a very high adaptational pressure is likely not 
to produce any far-going domestic changes, as the domestic opposition will be too 
high to overcome. Likewise no misfit will not generate any pressures and thus not 
induce any changes. (Börzel and Risse 2003)  
 
The next step of a top-down analysis is to look at mediating factors, which next to 
pressure is the second condition for domestic change (Schmidt 2002). Mediating 
factors are domestic variables facilitating or obstructing the adaptation to EU-
requirements. The role of the different mediating factors is basically founded in 
new-institutionalist theories. The assumption is that institutional change or the 
lack of change can be explained by reference to either the logic of appropriateness 
or consequentiality, which are the main drivers behind the behaviour actors. 
However as Radaelli points out, the top-down framework either way basically 
resort to a structural explanation because the assumptions is that actors are 
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ultimately constrained by the adaptational pressures, which are structural. 
Furthermore the degree of fit is not an objective measure; it is rather a social 
construction, which makes it a more complicated concept to utilize than it seems 
(Radaelli 2004: 7). We will return to this discussion about structure and agency 
below. These were the basic features of a stylised top-down perspective, which 
basically operate with the European integration, the goodness of fit and domestic 
mediating factors as the main independent or intervening variables able to explain 
the dependent variable; domestic structural change (Radaelli and Pasquier 2006: 
11). For application of a top-down perspective, see Schmidt (2002). 
 
Quite different from a top-down approach is the bottom-up perspective, which 
basically analyse the changes in domestic structures over time, and try to 
investigate whether the factors facilitating the changes can be traced back to the 
EU, the domestic sphere, international processes or an interplay between the 
different actors and levels. Radaelli, who is one of the strongest proponents of a 
bottom-up approach, sometimes also refer to this as an inside-out perspective 
(Radaelli 2003: 51). 
 
Probably the main strength of this approach, compared to a top-down approach, is 
that it is open to other variables than EU-requirements and domestic factors. 
Thereby it tends not to prejudge and overestimate the impact of the EU. When a 
policy is followed from the EU-level to domestic level, then the assessment of its 
impact on the domestic level will be dominated by the EU-influences, while other 
factors will have a tendency to be neglected, hence, there will be a risk of not 
giving a true image of the real causes of change (Radaelli 2004: 9). Even though, 
this is the theoretical basis, it is not straightforward to open up for, what might be 
an infinite list of, other variables. Abstract models should always be as close to 
reality as possible, without opening for too many variables that could contain a 
fraction of the explanation. A hermetically closed model on the other hand, will 
risk simplifying matters too much, while a very open model runs the risk of not 
being practically applicable, because the researcher has to account for a 
complexity, which is bigger than what is feasible or desirable. The bottom-up 
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research design thus also disclose some of the limitations of applying simplified 
notions of dependent and independent variables to an analysis of a reality that is 
unavoidably more complex than what can be captured by referring to a short list 
of variables (Radaelli 2004: 4). We would however still argue that identifying 
analytical variables can be a powerful tool, if the researcher is consciously aware 
that the ideal types he operates with are indeed theoretical snapshots of reality. 
The challenge is always to strike a middle ground, and to be “[…] clear enough to 
be wrong […]” (Sabatier in Radaelli 2004: 15).  
 
Radaelli has depicted the two approaches like this: 
EU   → Domestic Top-down/baseline design 
Domestic  → Domestic Bottom-up design 
    ↑ 
 European variables 
 
Figure 1. Research designs in the study of Europeanization, based on Radaelli (2004 fig. 1) and 
Radaelli and Pasquier (2006 fig. 1 and 3). 
 
The figure basically shows how a top-down analysis starts at the EU-level 
following a specific measure down to asses the impact on domestic structures, 
while the bottom-up starts and ends at the domestic level, assessing the relative 
impact of EU measures. 
2.1.3 How to strengthen the conclusions 
Radaelli (2004) propose to apply a basic test in order to qualify conclusions on the 
nature of Europeanization and domestic change. The first part of it is to make sure 
that Europeanization preceded the domestic change; if domestic reform processes 
were already initiated before EU-requirements were put in place it is difficult to 
claim that EU caused the reforms. However, just because one process precedes the 
other, they do not necessarily have to be correlated. Thus Radaelli propose a 
second test, which is a counterfactual assessment of whether change would have 
occurred without Europeanization? (Radaelli 2004: 9). We will come back to the 
aspect of counterfactual analysis below. 
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We have chosen to apply a bottom-up perspective drawing on especially Radaelli 
(2003 and 2004) and Grabbe (2003). This is mainly due to our presumption that 
there has been other factors or actors than the EU influencing the regional policies 
of the Czech Republic. This argument is supported by many scholars; e.g. Grabbe 
argue that in the case of the applicant states, both the Commission and national 
governments in the CEECs had obvious reasons for emphasising the exceptional 
impact that EU-requirements and funds etc. had on the pre-accession reform 
processes, thus making bottom-up analysis necessary in order to try to reveal 
some of the underlying dynamics (Grabbe 2003: 324). As researchers we are not 
preoccupied with pleasing policy makers and decision makers anywhere and thus 
we find that in adapting the bottom-up perspective we will be more open for a 
nuanced explanation than through the top-down approach. Because as Grabbe puts 
it: 
 
A systematic examination of the limitations on EU influence is an essential part 
of assessing the degree to which the European Union is responsible for the 
changes that have taken place. 
(Grabbe 2003: 305) 
 
These limitations we will try to explore by drawing on Haverland (2005) who has 
dedicated an entire article to the issue of case-selection and the methodological 
issue of checking for other variables than Europeanization, and he also suggest to, 
engage in counterfactual reasoning in order to check for the influence of 
Europeanization.  
 
Counterfactual is a thought experiment in the methodological meaning of the 
word: it allows for the manipulation of the variable of interest while controlling 
for other variables. 
(Haverland 2005: 4)  
 
It is important not to take this as a methodological green card for unlimited 
speculation, thus Haverland set up three conditions for a compelling 
counterfactual: 1. Clarity, it must be clearly specified what the dependent and 
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independent variables are and what they entail. 2. Historical consistency, the 
researcher should rewrite history as little as possible and 3. Theoretical 
consistency, the counterfactuals should be theoretically well informed and the 
assumptions they build on should be clearly specified. (Haverland 2005: 5-6) We 
intend to use this as a tool for challenging our analytical conclusions, thus we will 
tentatively discuss whether Czech regional policy reforms would have developed 
as fast as it did or if it at all would have happened without the influence of the EU 
regional policies. The reason why we can not ask the superficially more obvious 
question; what would have happened if the EU did not exist at all?, is because of 
the second criterion of historical consistency. If the EU did not exist the European 
context would probably look very different from now, and thus it would be to 
rewrite history so much that it would become too speculative to be compelling. 
 
We will return to outline our research design in the concluding remarks of this 
chapter, first though the following sections will we feature a description of the 
main hypotheses concerning the possible outcomes of Europeanization and the 
mechanisms they function through. Further, we will try to establish the theoretical 
ground for measuring the impact of Europeanization at the domestic level. 
2.1.4 Measuring Europeanization 
Before we can proceed to an analysis of the extent which the Czech Republic’s 
regional policy has been Europeanized, we need to define what we mean by 
Europeanized and what the objects of Europeanization can be. Radaelli 
distinguish between macrodomestic structures of e.g. political and legal 
structures, public policy entailing e.g. actors, problems, instruments and resources 
plus cognitive-normative structures which is e.g. discourse, norms, values, 
traditions, identity, policy paradigms and narratives as the domains of 
Europeanization. These distinctions should be drawn for analytical reasons only, 
and it may be rather difficult to tell the real difference between e.g. policies and 
structures, while one might in fact have profound impacts on the other (Radaelli 
2003: 35-36). As we focus on Czech regional policy we mainly operate within the 
domain of public policy. According to Radaelli, probably the domain influenced 
most by Europeanization will be the domestic public policy (Radaelli 2003: 40). 
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Thus, this focus area will provide a large opportunity to see significant changes, 
which might also spill over into changes of more basic governance structures. 
Furthermore, as we will se below, the mechanisms of Europeanization are not 
restricted by this taxonomy, thus it may indeed be difficult to make this distinction 
in reality. 
 
Specifying what can be the object of Europeanization makes it possible for us to 
hypothesise on the possible domestic outcomes and responses that 
Europeanization might produce. Radaelli (2003: 35) proposes a continuum for 
measuring the direction of policy change as the outcomes of Europeanization. The 
continuum operates with retrenchment, inertia, absorption and transformation 
(Radaelli 2003: 37), which can be depicted like this:  
Retrenchment          Inertia          Absorption          Transformation 
<----------------------------------------------------------------------------------> 
-                       0                      +                         ++ 
Figure 2. Direction of policy change. (Radaelli 2003: 35, figure 2.1b) 
 
Inertia is when Europeanization does not result in changes in the member state, 
thus the value 0 on the scale, even if there is misfit between the domestic and the 
European level. This means that member states choose to maintain status quo and 
do not seek to comply with EU requirements. The reason for this can be that there 
is a high misfit. It may simply be too difficult for the member state to adjust to the 
demands from the EU in order to meet the requirements or the domestic actors 
and institutions might not wish or be able to incorporate the requirements in the 
logic of domestic operations (Radaelli 2003: 37). This might have been the case of 
the Czech Republic’s regional policy in the first period after the fall of 
communism. 
 
Retrenchment is a negative form of Europeanization, hence the negative value in 
the figure. If the outcome of Europeanization is retrenchment it means that the 
domestic structures has become less Europeanized than before it was required to 
adapt to European norms and requirements, e.g. because domestic coalitions 
opposed to reform have been strengthened by the EU-pressure (Radaelli 2003: 
38). A tentative suggestion could be that this could maybe also have been the case 
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of the initial Czech resistance to reform of regional policies. At least as we will 
see below Prime Minister Klaus was very reluctant to engage in decentralisation 
and managed to block major progress in this area for a long period of time. If this 
was a case of inertia or retrenchement is prima facie hard to establish in absolute 
terms, but we will come back to this issue in our analysis of the Czech response to 
EU regional policy requirements. 
 
Absorption indicates changes which are non-fundamental, also pointed to as 
accommodation. Hence changes do occur but they are of a small significance, and 
the central state’s policy is maintained and supported, only nonessential structures 
are changed and modified, due to the process of Europeanization. (Börzel & Risse 
2000:14). Our preliminary hypothesis is that the first phase of actual Czech 
adjustments to the EU regional policy can be characterized as absorption, since 
only the basic requirements were met, and an institution like the Ministry of 
Regional Development was vested with very limited competences. 
 
Paradigmatic changes are also called transformation. This does not happen in a 
situation of low misfit between domestic and European structures, since cases of 
low misfit simply do not call for profound changes. Transformation implies that 
existing policies are dramatically replaced by alternative ones and institutional 
structures are either replaced by fundamentally new ones or radically transformed 
due to Europeanization (Börzel & Risse 2000: 14). Our working thesis is that the 
Czech regional policy eventually is a case of transformation, since a path has been 
followed which were radically different than what the country had ever 
experienced. 
 
The danger of applying a terminology, implying that it is possible to measure an 
outcome, is the pitfall of degreeism, which both Grabbe (2003) and Radaelli 
(2003) warns about. This occurs if one tends to overemphasise the role of 
Europeanization, “[…] we may fail to notice that other processes are producing 
the effects […]” (Grabbe 2003: 310). Then we might end up failing to recognise 
the profound differences in the observed phenomena, and start measuring different 
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degrees of cat-dogs4 (Grabbe 2003: 310 and Radaelli 2003: 32). Though, with our 
bottom-up research agenda in mind, we hope not to be too narrowly focussed on 
European variables. 
 
In terms of outcome a central issue of the Europeanization literature has also been 
whether we can expect cross-European convergence or divergence, and the 
empirical conclusions on this question have been somewhat ambiguous. However 
the tendency generally goes in the direction of a differentiated response to 
Europeanization being the thing to expect rather than convergence (Olsen 2002). 
However as Lenschow points out “non-convergence must not be confused with 
the maintenance of status quo” (Lenschow 2006: 68). This basically points to the 
hypothesis that the national domestic structures have a huge impact on the 
domestic outcome of European policies, which is the assumption that we base a 
greater part of our analysis on. In her study of national core executive adaptation 
to the engagements with the EU, Laffan (2003) found; that even if there are 
“[c]onvergence of Structures [Europeanization] has not led to a convergence of 
national styles and processes of managing European affairs.”(Laffan 2003: 14) 
Laffan’s findings point to another feature of the outcome of Europeanization; that 
there can be convergence at many different levels and along different lines. For 
measuring convergence Radaelli propose a continuum where the simplest form of 
convergence is sharing the same vocabularies or discourses. A higher degree of 
convergence is on the ideational dimension, which means sharing of ideas, 
paradigms and good practices. The next level is similarity in decisions and the 
highest degree of convergence is convergence in policy outcomes (Radaelli 2004: 
14). The assessment of cross-European convergence is most appropriate for 
studies comparing Europeanization outcomes of different countries or sectors, and 
as we rather perform an in-depth analysis of one country we will not analyse the 
question of convergence further. On the other hand the continuum also relates to 
the domains of Europeanization, and the distinction between e.g. decisions and 
                                                 
4 The original metaphor, which Grabbe (2003) borrows from Radaelli (2003) draws on an often 
cited argument by Sartori, goes like this: “Degreeism […] occurs when differences in kind are 
replaced by differences of degrees. As we are not able to tell the difference between a cat and a 
dog, we speak of different degrees of cat-dogs” (Radaelli 2003: 32). 
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policy outcomes is for instance very relevant also for our study. E.g. as we will see 
below the Czech constitution provided for the establishment of regional self-
governing units between the level of the municipalities and central government, 
without this being realised for almost ten years. 
2.1.5 The Mechanisms of Europeanization 
The mechanisms, which Europeanization operates through, are basically the 
different processes, that the EU is engaged in. In relation to the many applications 
of the concept of Europeanization, Lenschow (2006) identifies four different 
processes at work, they comprise: “[…] bottom-up (national state→EU), top-
down (EU→national state), horizontal (state→state) and round about (national 
state→EU→national state) process [es]” (Lenschow 2006: 57). However in 
Radaelli’s definition he only emphasises that Europeanization covers vertical and 
horizontal mechanisms, even though we doubt that they would disagree on 
Lenschow’s findings, which are basically rather trivial and uncontroversial.  
 
Vertical mechanisms seem to demarcate clearly the EU level (where policy is 
defined) and the domestic level, where policy has to be metabolised. 
(Radaelli 2003: 41) 
 
Thus with vertical mechanisms we are here dealing with a top-down theoretical 
perspective which should not be confused with a methodological top-down 
perspective. Horizontal mechanisms are at play when there is no specific EU 
pressure to make domestic change. (Radaelli 2003: 41) However there might 
indeed be explicit or implicit pressures from other member states, which is the 
case with e.g. the Open Method of Coordination, which apply cross-national 
benchmarking and policy learning as the main governance tools (Borras and 
Jacobsson 2004).  
 
The difference in mechanisms is connected to different modes of EU policies. 
Wallace has identified five different modes of EU policy:  the traditional 
Community method, the EU regulatory mode, the distributional mode, policy 
coordination and intensive transgovernmentalism (Wallace 2005: 79). Knill and 
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Lenschow identify three governance patterns of EU regulatory policy: coercion, 
competition and communication (Knill and Lenschow 2005). Radaelli also 
identify three different overall categories, where the two (presence of a European 
model and negative integration) are vertical mechanisms and the third category 
(framing mechanisms) cover horizontal processes (Radaelli 2003: 41). The 
mentioned categorisations are basically descriptions of the same phenomena, but 
viewed from different perspectives. The features of the different policy modes 
hypothetically spur different responses from the affected institutions and actors. In 
a case of coercive EU-governance, the hypothesis is paradoxically that very little 
institutional change can be expected in member states, due to the national 
bureaucracies’ incentives to protect traditional structures. The paradox is that 
policies implemented via pressure and coercion often is meant to bring 
harmonization and cross-European convergence, which it is thus not able to 
deliver (Knill and Lenschow 2005: 858). With the candidate states however, a 
total different outcome can be expected in case of coercion which was by far the 
most prominent governance pattern of the accession processes.  First of all the 
candidates were only consumers of EU policies and requirements and could not 
upload their own preferences into the EU policy process. Thus they could not 
object to the requirements that in some way did not fit their national settings and 
preferences. As they had to earn the potential to become members of EU, they 
faced strong incentives to implement the required EU models, and thus they 
allegedly reacted upon coercive forms of EU adaptational pressures differently 
than we can expect current members to do (Grabbe 2003: 312-313).  
2.1.6 Mechanisms and enlargement 
We will not go further into depth with the above mentioned mechanisms here, 
since Grabbe (2003) has identified the main mechanisms that the candidate states 
of the 2004 round of enlargements were subject to, which was also the case of the 
Czech accession process. Grabbe has identified these mechanisms partly on the 
basis of her own rather extensive research into the enlargement processes, and 
thus we feel that her categories provide a reliable overview of the mechanisms at 
play. She divides these mechanisms of Europeanization into five categories:  
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1. Models (provision of legislative and institutional templates), 2. Money (aid 
and technical assistance), 3. Benchmarking and monitoring, 4. Advice and 
twinning plus 5. Gate-keeping (access to negotiations and further stages in the 
accession process.) 
 (Grabbe 2003: 312).  
 
Here we also see both vertical and more horizontal mechanisms at play, while 
some of them are indeed not specific to the case of candidate countries. E.g. 
benchmarking is increasingly being applied as a governance tool for all member 
states, in policy areas where the EU has no formal competencies. In addition it 
seems as if the Commission has learned a lot from the monitoring and 
benchmarking exercises of the enlargement process, which today also puts the old 
member states under pressure to improve or even reform (Grabbe 2003: 312). In 
fact all of these five mechanisms apply to our case of the reform of Czech regional 
policies, though a few seem to be of greater significance than others.  
 
The legislative and institutional models, which the EU provided for 
implementation in the candidate countries, have been a major part of the accession 
process. All candidates had to take on all EU laws and norms and implement the 
entire Acquis Communautaire, this was divided in to the chapters and sub-
chapters (Grabbe 2003: 312-313). The chapter, which we will elaborate on in the 
analytical chapters below, deals with regional policy and provides the main 
requirements for the regional policies of the candidate countries. As we will see 
below it has not always been straightforward for the candidates to figure out the 
essence of these requirements. However when EU provides models to implement, 
the candidate states are under pressure to adapt these, which implies coercion 
(Radaelli 2003: 42).  
 
The second mechanism: Money which entails aid and technical assistance has 
also been a major factor in our case. The pre-accession funds, of which Phare was 
the most significant, played an important role in the transfer of EU norms, because 
the fund programmes provided for help to pay for the implementation of the 
Acquis. Technical assistance connected to the funds furthermore assisted in the 
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build up of “[…] institutional capacity to use EU practices […]” (Grabbe 2003: 
314). The impact of the funds also reached further than the imminent 
improvements of the infrastructure etc. e.g.  
 
[t]he co-financing requirements force applicant countries to allocate public 
resources to particular policy areas […] so EU aid can change the order of 
priorities on a government’s agenda. 
 (Grabbe 2003: 314)  
 
The partnership principle has also proved to put immense pressure on member 
states to build regional administrative capacity, in order for regional actors to take 
part in EU co-funded projects (Bailey and De Propris 2002), thus this pressure 
must naturally also have applied to candidate states. This is basically also a case 
of coercion. 
 
Benchmarking and monitoring has also been an important “[…] mechanism in the 
conditionality for membership […]” (Grabbe 2003: 315). The Commission has 
annually published progress reports, evaluating each candidate’s progress towards 
fulfilling the accession criteria. These reports were potentially a direct influence 
on national policy making, because they set “[…] out a list of policy ‘priorities’ 
that [had] to be implemented […]” (Grabbe 2003: 315).  
 
Advice and twinning entails e.g. interchanging civil servants from member states, 
to work in different parts of the public administration. This was potentially a great 
source of influence, however many civil servants was naturally preoccupied with 
technical problems and standards etc. compared to the overall design of 
governance structures etc. Thus the impact on institutional structures might not 
have been that considerable compared to some of the other mechanisms. In terms 
of cross-European convergence, this mechanism most likely provides divergence, 
since it makes a big difference where in the EU an advisor comes from and what 
his/hers national background is etc. (Grabbe 2003: 315). This is in fact the only 
mechanism that Grabbe has identified in connection to the candidates, which was 
a somewhat horizontal mechanism. Thus a deeper analysis into the aspect of 
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twinning will possibly be a promising source of information about the impact of 
softer mechanisms of Europeanization in the candidate states, we will only touch 
tentatively upon this mechanism below, and as such we leave it up to others to 
provide this in-depth analysis of twinning. 
 
The final mechanism was gate-keeping of access to negotiations and further 
stages in the accession process, which was allegedly the most powerful 
conditionality tool that the EU had on the candidates. The fact that the EU could 
in principle at any time break off further negotiations with a candidate provided a 
powerful incentive for them to comply with requirements and engage in the 
reform processes recommended by the Commission (Grabbe 2003: 316).  
2.1.7 Power asymmetry and uncertainty 
This gate-keeping underlines the asymmetry of interdependence and power, which 
Grabbe holds to be one of two important intervening variables applying to the 
case of the candidates. This basically can be explained by the fact that the 
candidates wanted membership more that the member states wanted enlargement, 
“[…] the EU has all the benefits to offer […]”, as Grabbe puts it (Grabbe 2003: 
318).  
 
The other special intervening variable was the many uncertainties that 
characterized the accession process. In this respect Grabbe identifies five 
important uncertainties that were built into the accession process. The uncertainty 
was about: 1. Policy agenda, it was not always clear what implications the 
requirements actually had for the candidates. 2. Hierarchy of tasks, it was not 
clear if the different requirements were ranked in any way, “[t]he EU official 
position was that all 80,000-plus pages of the acquis had to be implemented; yet it 
was obvious that some pages […] were more important than others” (Grabbe 
2003: 319), under all circumstances this informal ranking was naturally not easy 
to comprehend for the candidates. 3. Timing, it was often unclear when exactly the 
different requirements had to be met. Connected to timing was an issue of costs 
and benefits, since the adaptation had to be undertaken before accession, where 
the predicted reward would occur for the candidates. 4. Whom to satisfy, it was not 
  
26 
always clear whether a candidate would gain the most by satisfying the 
Commission or some of the more influential member states, as the EU policy 
landscape is a somewhat mixed picture this was not an easy puzzle to solve. The 
last uncertainty was about 5. Standards and thresholds, there were no easy 
applicable objective techniques or indicators to measure when requirements were 
met by a candidate. Grabbe argues that the power asymmetry and the uncertainty 
are basically intervening variables, (Grabbe 2003: 318ff) but as they are closely 
connected to the coercive mechanism of Europeanization we have shortly 
presented and discussed them here. We will elaborate on possible domestic 
variables below.  
2.2 Explaining institutional change or stability 
What we are basically trying to capture in this project is how, why and how much 
Czech institutional structures has changed, either as a response to some EU-
processes or maybe other international trends, or maybe as a reflection of 
dynamics stemming from the domestic sphere. In order to be able to account for 
these processes of institutional change we find it useful to introduce a historical 
new-institutionalist perspective, which has been applied to many Europeanization 
studies before this. The basic assumption of new-institutionalist theories is that 
“[…] institutions do matter […] ” (Knill 2001: 20), but apart from this 
presumption of limited controversy, new-institutionalism is an incoherent mass of 
theory, conceptualizing “[…] how, why and to what extent institutions make a 
difference […]” from different perspectives (Knill 2001: 20). The two basic new-
institutionalist approaches are sociological institutionalism and rational choice 
institutionalism (Knill 2001: 20, Börzel and Risse 2003: 58, Goetz 2006: 33, 
Pollack 2004: 138-139, March and Olsen 1989, Bogason 1989). A sociological 
institutionalist perspective emphasizes that the logic of human behaviour is the 
logic of appropriateness, focusing on the role of institutionalized “[…] norms and 
collective understandings attached to them[…] ” (Börzel and Risse 2003: 58). A 
rational choice approach focus on the logic of consequentialism (Börzel and Risse 
2003: 58), which accounts for the strategic goal oriented behaviour that 
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individuals conduct within the institutionally determined rules of the game (Knill 
2001: 20).  
 
The differences in the two approaches are evident in the way institutions are 
defined from the two perspectives. A rational choice institutionalist defines 
institutions as: “Systems of rules that structure the courses of actions that a set of 
actors may choose” (Scharpf 1997: 38). Rules are understood here as not only 
formal rules and regulations, but also e.g. informal norms for social behaviour 
etc., which although informal can still be enforced by sanctioning rule breakers 
(Scharpf 1997: 38ff). March and Olsen who are some of the most prominent 
proponents of the sociological institutionalist approach also looks at rules, but 
apply a somehow broader definition:  
 
By ”rules” we mean the routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, 
organizational forms, and technologies around which political activity is 
constructed. We also mean the beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures and knowledge 
that surround, support, elaborate, and contradict those roles and routines.  
(March and Olsen 1989: 22) 
 
The interesting thing from this perspective is: “[…] the ways in which the 
institutionalization of action through rules […] affects politics” (March and Olsen 
1989: 21) plus policies and polities as we might add drawing on some of the 
discussions above. 
 
The two approaches tend to focus either on institutions or actors as the main 
factors capable of inducing change or keeping stability. Thus, they make radically 
different ontological assumptions about the possible impacts of either structures or 
agents, which is a discussion situated in the heart of the social sciences. The 
sociological institutionalism is institution based, emphasizing the structuring 
impacts of institutions on the interests and strategies of individuals. According to 
this view institutions also tend to be persistent over time, even though their 
surroundings may change, and as such they are treated as the most prominent 
independent variable determining the outcome of a specific process, in which the 
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ideas and preferences of the actors may be moulded by the structures. On the 
contrary a rational choice approach treats institutions rather as intervening 
variables, because they determine the structures for the strategic behaviour of 
individuals. The independent variables are the interests of the actors, which 
institutions are incapable of altering or affecting. Thus this is a more agency based 
approach, holding the predetermined interests of individual actors to be the main 
key to explain an outcome. (Knill 2001) 
 
As the sociological institutionalist perspective predominantly holds institutional 
structures as the independent variables, which basically contain the explanations 
of policy outcomes, it is well fit for explaining the stickiness and persistence of 
the same institutions. However an entirely structural perspective has a limited 
capability to account for institutional change, and sociological institutionalist 
approaches – although not entirely structural - often apply concepts like external 
shocks or fundamental performance crises, to explain why the otherwise sticky 
institutions eventually change. Since these shocks or crises remain exogenous to 
the explanatory model, they are difficult to account for. Thus the sociological 
approach risks predetermining institutional persistence and stability, with the cost 
of not being able to account for changes unless they take revolutionary 
proportions (Knill 2001: 22). The agency-based rational choice approaches on the 
other hand “[…] are not as biased in favour of institutional stability, thus they 
can equally well account for stability and change […]” (Knill 2001: 24). 
However as Knill points out they are rather open, which is an analytical weakness 
in the sense that a researcher therefore is faced with the challenge of having to 
capture a huge complexity in the empirical case studies. Thus, the more abstract 
features of the institution-based models may be of better use for hypothesizing the 
conditions for institutional change or stability (Knill 2001: 24). Taking a closer 
look at the two approaches it becomes clear, that they capture the same empirical 
phenomenon from two different levels of abstraction, simply using scales of a 
different size. Thus what may seem as huge changes from the rational choice 
micro-perspective, may indeed appear to be a case of continuity viewed from a 
macro-perspective of sociological institutionalism (Knill 2001: 27-30).  
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Even though sociological institutionalism has a clear bias towards predicting 
institutional stability over change it is not entirely true to claim that the logic of 
appropriateness can not account for changes, but it is a longer process of 
internalising e.g. European norms and ideas into the domestic logic. It can happen 
through processes of arguing, learning and socialisation, which over a longer 
time span might alter the preferences, the norms and ideas of individuals and 
domestic collective understandings and formal and informal rules. Furthermore in 
order to reduce uncertainty and complexity institutions might mimic other 
institutions in order to overcome them. (Börzel and Risse 2003: 68) Thus 
domestic institutions might imitate EU arrangements and norms, even without 
formal or informal adaptational pressures (Grabbe 2003: 314). 
 
Either way the two approaches have strengths and weaknesses, and we will in the 
following try to combine them. Furthermore, we will introduce our historical 
institutionalist approach drawing on Knill (2001), who develops a synthesis of the 
two logics, combined with an emphasis on the impact of history. 
2.2.1 Historical institutionalism 
The historical institutionalist approach suggested by Knill (2001) is definitely 
inspired by the sociological institutionalist theories, but seeks to overcome the 
above mentioned determinism, by linking it with a rational choice framework. As 
Knill points out, drawing on the works of Scharpf and Mayntz, it may be difficult 
to tell whether a specific observed behaviour was informed by a logic of 
appropriateness or consequentiality. Thus combining the two being open to both 
explanations offers a more realistic model (Knill 2001: 26). In order to avoid the 
deterministic bias, the conception of institutions is also narrowed slightly, 
compared to the almost all-encompassing sociological institutionalist definition. 
Thus it only entails:  
 
[…] sets of formal and informal rules, norms and conventions that prescribe the 
behavioural roles, shape expectations, and constrain and enable activities […] 
 (Knill 2001: 26) 
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This perception is compatible with Radaelli‘s conception of Europeanization, 
which focused on “[…] formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, 
styles ‘ways of doing things‘, and shared beliefs and norms […]“ (Radaelli 2003: 
30). Even though Radaelli specify his institutional concept slightly more than 
Knill, they basically capture the same phenomena, and thus combining insights 
and concepts from them both, gives no inconsistency in our overall theoretical and 
analytical approach. 
  
The starting point of an analysis should be an abstract sociological approach, but 
strategic behaviour should be considered as an independent factor in its own right 
if the institutions do not hold the key to a sufficient explanation. The criteria for 
when to climb down the so called ladder of abstraction, in order to explain 
institutional change is only in cases where “[…] the adaptational requirements 
emerging from European policies remain within the range of options defined by 
the macro-institutional context […]” (Knill 2001: 31). This is because the 
sociological and historical approaches view institutional dynamics as being path-
dependent or following a logic of appropriateness, thus assuming that changes at 
the micro-level can only be expected when requirements to be met fall within the 
scope made possible by the “[…] macro-institutional rules and standard 
operating procedures […]” (Knill 2001: 31). This hypothesis is not significantly 
different from the goodness of fit thesis, suggesting that domestic changes should 
only be expected when the misfit is not too big, at least not from at sociological 
institutionalist perspective (Börzel and Risse 2003: 71). Either way, it can provide 
us with guidelines to identify the cases in which changes can be expected, because 
the institutions basically provide the options available for the actors. However, on 
this basis we can make limited hypotheses about the emergence and the features 
of this change, thus we also need to resort to more agency-based rational choice 
explanatory models. This perspective can retrospectively provide us with valuable 
insights into how and to what extent domestic actors have been able to exploit 
potentially new opportunity structures appearing as a result of EU-policies.  
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Thus we have arrived at a theory, which combines the two logics of human 
behaviour into the same explanatory framework, while on the same time paying 
attention to history as a distinct intervening variable (Knill 2001: 30-31). 
 
2.2.2 Mediating factors 
In order to operationalize the institutionalist part of the theoretical framework, we 
have chosen to draw on a range of concepts stemming from Europeanization 
studies, all basically derived from the institutionalist approaches accounted for 
above. This is what has been termed mediating factors (Schmidt 2002) or 
facilitating factors (Börzel and Risse 2003), which are domestic intervening 
variables facilitating or inhibiting processes of adaptation to EU-requirements. 
The concept of mediating factors stems from - and has most often been applied to 
- top-down studies of Europeanization processes. However, since our case seems 
to be most prominently one of coercion and EU pressures we see no weakness in 
applying these concepts to our bottom-up study. Applying some useful concepts 
from the top-down tradition does not per se make our study top-down, as long as 
we stick to a bottom-up research design we will not end up in the deterministic 
bias inherited in top-down approaches. 
 
Börzel and Risse (2003) and Schmidt (2002) list up a range of domestic factors, 
which next to a certain degree of misfit are the conditions for change. One 
problem we see in their approach is that they claim to make an exhaustive list of 
possible domestic factors capable of mediating an outcome. We will on the 
contrary not claim to have such an all-encompassing model. We will try to define 
the most important domestic factors, and focus on them through the analysis. 
Hereby we delimit our focus to a few major facilitating factors rather than taking 
all possible factors into account. In doing this we are aware that we may only have 
captured a fraction of the truth, because one’s conclusion is never stronger than 
the theoretical assumptions and concepts it is based on. 
 
The literature concerning mediating factor provides us with a long list of concepts 
describing different ways of operationalizing the rational choice and sociological 
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institutionalisms. Here we will only account briefly for some factors that we deem 
important in the case of Czech regional policy reforms, since the explanatory 
strengths of the concepts also will be resolved in connection with the analysis in 
the following chapters. In Europeanization studies, as characterized by Börzel and 
Risse (2003) and some of their collaborators, the concepts are boiled down to four 
factors, two stemming from each of the two logics of behaviour. Other scholars 
like Schmidt and Versluis have also provided us with useful discussions and 
hypotheses on the possible impact of different domestic factors. 
 
The mediating factors which we have chosen to focus on are listed in table 1. 
 
Theory Mediating factor5 
Veto points Rational choice 
institutionalism Formal institutions 
Political institutional 
capacity 
Change agents / norm 
entrepreneurs 
Political culture / 
informal institutions 
Discourse Sociological 
institutionalism 
Economic vulnerability Issue salience 
Policy legacies Historical 
institutionalism Policy preferences 
Table 1. mediating factors derived from new-institutionalist theories, based on Börzel and Risse 
(2003), Schmidt (2002) and Versluis (2004). 
 
A factor derived from rational choice explanations is: the presence of veto points. 
The hypothesis is that the more formal or informal veto points or players there are 
in the national political system, the lower the probability for change. On the other 
hand if a set of formal institutions exists, which can give actors incentives to 
exploit opportunities arising from the EU policies, it can be a strong facilitator in 
the implementation of EU requirements. Schmidt converge these two explanations 
into one concept political institutional capacity (Schmidt 2002: 899). Either way 
the veto points in the political system and the formal institutions can help explain 
whether national actors have been able to exploit the opportunities provided by an 
EU process, and overcome the national constraints to change. (Börzel and Risse 
2003: 64-65)  
 
                                                 
5 If relevant the concept with the broadest scope is situated in the right column. 
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The factors derived from sociological explanations are: the presence of change 
agents or norm entrepeneurs, which are powerful agents possibly able to persuade 
policy-makers and other actors to redefine their preferences by using moral 
arguments. This hypothesis also draws on theories of network governance 
identifying two types of norm- and idea-promoting agents: the first is epistemic 
communities, which were first described by Haas, and consist of experts on a 
specific issue, thus they have an “[…] authoritative claim to knowledge and a 
normative agenda […]“ (Börzel and Risse 2003: 67). Qua this perceived 
monopoly on the reasonable solutions they can promote a certain agenda and 
thereby affect the ideas and interests of others, inducing change. Advocacy 
networks on the other hand has a more normative point of reference, “[…] bound 
together by shared beliefs and values rather than by consensual knowledge […]“ 
(Börzel and Risse 2003: 67). However the mechanisms of persuasion and social 
learning are the same for both types of agents. This is contrary to what we have 
claimed above, a rather actor oriented explanation based on sociological 
institutionalism. However the second factor derived from sociological 
institutionalism: political culture or informal institutions is a rather structural 
explanation. The hypothesis is that it matters whether the domestic political 
culture and the collective understandings of appropriate behaviour is oriented on 
consensus or conflict.  A consensus culture can e.g. help overcome veto points by 
rendering it inappropriate to use formally vested veto powers. (Börzel and Risse 
2003: 67-68) Schmidt‘s conception of discourse as a mediating factor basically 
encompass both these aspects, or basically all the sociological institutionalist 
explanations. She apply discourse in its broadest definition, meaning that it 
basically structure appropriate behaviour, but also has an interactive element to it, 
because it serves the purpose of specific actors over others. She thereby includes, 
in part, the structural but also the actor based aspects of discourse in her 
explanation (Schmidt 2002: 900).  
 
Versluis (2004) goes in a slightly different direction when she claims that issue 
salience understood as: “[…] the visibility of and the importance attached to a 
topic […] conditions behaviour […]“ (Versluis 2004: 10). Two factors allegedly 
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trigger attention to a topic and can cause changes in policies: the first is Risk, 
understood as the publicly perceived risk attached to an issue while the second is 
focussing events, which are events such as disasters, accidents or crises (Versluis 
2004: 10-11). A factor somehow similar to the perceived risk is captured by 
Schmidt under the heading economic vulnerability, which refers to the domestic 
perception of economic vulnerability or even crisis, that can likewise either cause 
willingness or reluctance to engage in reforms (Schmidt 2002: 898). On the other 
hand Schmidt‘s narrow focus on the economic conditions of a country seems 
justified since her article is focussing on economic policy adjustment. If she had a 
broader focus on general Europeanization processes our guess is that she would 
have derived a hypothesis somehow similar to the issue salience hypothesis. 
 
Path dependence is a historical institutionalist concept that describes the 
important role historical events and historically formed institutions have on 
shaping and determining the possible institutions and policies. When the 
institutions are formed, they define and lock–in a certain developments or 
evolutionary paths, which are difficult to change (Cypher and Dietz 2004: 72).  
Thus it is clear that it must be a domestic mediating factor, which is needs a little 
elaboration to be applicable. Schmidt (2002) manages to capture path-dependence 
in her description of the mediating factors’ policy legacies and policy preferences. 
The hypothesis behind policy legacies is basically not very different from the 
goodness of fit hypothesis, that if a country’s long-standing policies and 
institutional structures are compatible with the EU-requirements then there is little 
basis for change, but definitely higher probability of compliance with EU-norms. 
The probability for change however also depends on the rigidity of traditional 
policy preferences of vital actors and maybe the public.  
 
To sum up: not all these factors may be relevant for our case, but the ones that can 
be empirically identified carry a powerful explanation of the direction the Czech 
regional policies have taken in light of the application for membership of the EU. 
Concerning the merits of domestic mediating factors Bugdahn (2005) 
consequently refer to the process of mediation as domestication as opposed to 
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Europeanization. She define “[…] domestication of a policy area as a situation in 
which actors at the member state level choose non-EU recommended and non-EU 
prescribed domestic policy/administrative options […]” (Bugdahn 2005: 180). 
Not out of tune with our working thesis she concludes that Europeanization and 
domestication co-exist and interact in different forms and ways (Bugdahn 2005: 
192). How they have co-existed in the field of Czech regional policies is one of 
the issues we will try to explore in the analysis below. 
2.3 Research strategy 
In this chapter we have proposed an analytical framework, drawing on a bottom-
up approach to the study of Europeanization combined with a historical 
institutionalist perspective. We have discussed how Europeanization should be 
seen as a process, not as an analytical concept able to explain anything in its own 
right. In keeping with our bottom-up research design we will start our research at 
the domestic level in the Czech Republic, by analysing the changes in Czech 
regional policies especially with regards to decentralised governance structures, 
since the fall of communism. By doing this we will try to explore the main driving 
factors behind the changes in Czech regional policy, thus in our research design 
we will try not to prioritize EU factors over domestic factors. However in order to 
lift our research up into a somewhat broader context of European politics, we will 
also account for some pivotal features of the enlargement process, especially 
concerning EU’s Regional Policy, which has potentially been a major intervening 
variable in the transformation of Czech regional policies. Therefore we end up 
with a model with the Czech regional policies as the dependent variable, and 
domestic actors, institutions, legacies and preferences as the independent variable, 
while EU’s regional policy requirements and pre-accession funds towards the 
Czech Republic is our main intervening variable, as depicted in figure 2. 
 
Czech actors, institutions etc. → Czech regional policies 
 ↑ 
   EU’s regional policy and pre-accession funds 
 
Figure 2. Our research design. 
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Thus we hold the domestic factors to be the key to explain changes in domestic 
policies, but the EU’s involvement in Czech affairs might indeed have provided 
new opportunity structures for domestic actors to exploit and it may also have 
affected the interests and preferences of the domestic actors and institutions, and 
in this way the EU may have played a pivotal role in the post-communist reform 
of Czech regional policies. If, why and how this has happened is basically what we 
will analyse below.  
 
In order to guide our analysis we have derived a few more detailed research 
questions from our theoretical and methodological discussions above, and thus 
these questions will guide our analytical perspective on the observed 
developments and processes. In this way our analysis will enable us to answer our 
cardinal question. 
 
The first few questions basically relates to developments in the dependent 
variable, and the factors that has affected it: 
- How has the Czech regional policies developed since the fall of 
communism? 
- What has been the main domestic factors determining the course of Czech 
regional policies?  
- What has been the Czech response to the influence of Europeanization on 
domestic regional policies in terms of retrenchment, inertia, absorption and 
transformation? 
These questions will be analyzed in chapter 3, which will mainly focus on the 
domestic spheres, whereby we will be able to account for changes in the 
dependent variable, and the relative influence of both the indepedent and the 
intervening variable. 
 
The second set of questions relates to the features of the intervening variable, 
which is the conditions that the EU required the Czech Republic to live up to in 
the enlargement process, with regards to regional policies. As previously touched 
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upon there were many aspects in the enlargements process, but from our point of 
view two related issues were especially relevant: the requirements deriving from 
Acquis in the chapter concerning regional policy, and the pre-accession funds 
which also had specific requirements and objectives. 
- Which formal and informal requirements did the Acquis chapter on 
regional policy prescribe for the Czech regional policies, and were there 
any uncertainties in the interpretation of these requirements? 
- What were the conditions and objectives of Phare and other pre-accession 
funds and were there any problems in the design and ambitions of the 
funding systems? 
Analysing these questions, which we will do in chapter 4, will help us explain the 
main features of the mechanisms of Europeanization in the case of enlargement 
regional policy requirements, thereby we will be able to account for the coercive 
pressures that the EU put a candidate like the Czech Republic under. 
 
The last research question we will analyse is basically a counterfactual, and as 
such it does not give reason to empirical analysis. 
- How would the Czech regional policies have evolved if the EU did not 
have specific regional policy requirements attached to the accession 
criteria and pre-accession funds? 
Thus by posing this question we manipulate the intervening variable and try to 
keep the independent variable unchanged, thereby we wil be able to asses the 
relative importance of the EU policies. As this question can not be analysed 
empirically the analysis will have to be a tentative discussion, which we will take 
up in chapter 5 in relation to our conclusive analysis. Here we will, of course, also 
conclude on our findings and answer the cardinal question.  
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3 The Czech Republic’s regional policy after the collapse 
of communism 
The post-communist transformation-process of the Czech Republic has had a 
major focus on regional policy. The creation of the Czech regional policy has 
been characterized by large differences among domestic politicians; stemming 
from deeply rooted ideological disparities and policy preferences. We will in this 
chapter try to determine the roles of the central domestic actors and structures, and 
their internal relations in an attempt to map the most influential mediating factors 
at domestic level.  
Regional policy in the Czech Republic until the collapse of communism can, 
according to the Czech Republic’s Ministry for Regional Development (MRD), 
only be characterized by massive redistribution and reallocation of resources. This 
was due to a very rigid centralized state-system, which was built up after a Soviet 
model. The tasks of the regions were only administrative, following the decrees of 
the central government, and hence regional self-government was nonexistent. 
Furthermore, the lower levels of administration lacked any legal status. This 
meant that numerous problems in the area of regional development could easily be 
identified, primarily due to the lack of a systematic regional policy to target these 
(MRD webpage and Yoder 2001: 17f). After the collapse of communism there 
was an “[…] absolute disbelieve [sic] in planning of any form [and] National as 
well as regional plans no longer applied.” (MRD webpage). This was, as 
mentioned above, because the communist rule had reduced regional policy to 
socialist planning processes of redistribution and reallocation of resources (Jacoby 
and Černoch 2002: 8). But, nevertheless centralization rather than decentralization 
characterized the implementation of the first post-communist national reforms. 
The regions were abolished in 1990 and their responsibilities were transferred to 
the 77 districts, which then became responsible for carrying out the administration 
of the policies of the central government (Yoder 2001: 18). Between 1990 and 
1992 the doubts about the durability of the Czechoslovakian state decreased any 
aspirations of creating an EU inspired regional policy (Jacoby and Černoch, 2002: 
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8). However, following the collapse of the communist regime and the so-called 
‘Velvet Divorce’ from Slovakia, in 1993, the Czech Republic neglected the 
regional policy sector. This was partly due to the political focus of the then liberal 
government, which wanted to distance itself from the communist legacy of 
interventionist and redistributionist regional policies. The Czech Republic 
government led by Prime Minister Václav Klaus had a neo-liberal economic 
agenda, and pursued a centralist approach to government and thus was hesitant to 
create the institutional framework that could create regional decentralization 
(Baun, 2002: 267).  
 
Vaclav Klaus, Prime Minister (1993-1997) and currently President, has been one 
of the most prominent Czech EU-sceptics. He has displayed hesitation to comply 
with demands from the European Union, however his party – the biggest Czech 
right wing party; the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) – as a whole, has taken a pro-
European stance. Klaus see the EU as an intergovernmental organization that 
should focus mainly on liberalization of trade and the market. He claimed to be a 
“Eurorealist”, which by many was seen as a proxy for Klaus’ “Euroscepticism”. 
This Euroscepticism was rooted in his emphasis on the nation state as the field of 
sovereignty, which the EU poses a threat to when it interferes with domestic 
political issues. During the 1990’s his main political opponent was Vaclav Havel, 
the ‘hero’ from the Velvet Revolution in 1989, the last President of 
Czechoslovakia (1989-1993) and Czech President (1993-2003) and Klaus’ former 
party companion. He took a more federalist stance and saw European political and 
economic integration as a possibility for the Czech Republic to develop (Rovna 
2002: 207f).  
 
The centralist stance, of the Klaus government, on regional policy was reducing it 
to a mere redistribution of state funds, which was a long way from involving 
independent municipal and regional actors in setting policy priorities (Jacoby & 
Černoch 2002: 1). Domestic criticism followed the new administrative structure 
primarily because it lacked a connection between the municipal level, the district 
and the central government. The Article 99 of the new Czech Constitution of 1993 
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obliged the government to set up higher self-governing units with minimum 
interference by state authorities:  
The Czech Republic shall be divided into communities, which shall be 
fundamental self-governing territorial divisions, and regions, which shall be 
superior self-governing territorial divisions. 
 (Parliament of the Czech Republic 1993) 
 
Prime Minister Klaus and his party, the Civic Democratic Party, opposed this 
together with their coalition ally the Civic Democratic Alliance. However, the 
Christian Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Union supported the 
provision, and made their support of the Constitution conditional on the creation 
of higher self-governing units and Article 99. Hence the measure was passed 
(Yoder 2001: 18f). But, the disagreements about decentralization and 
regionalization continued between Prime Minister Klaus and President Havel and 
their respective supporters, and:  
The very concept of civil society, self-government, local democracy and even 
decentralization [became] contested political issues. 
 (Yoder 2001: 19) 
 
Klaus and his party were opposed to regionalization for political and ideological 
reasons and they 
 […] delayed, or even torpedoed, continuation of the reform of the intermediary 
level because of fears that [they] would lose control of the country’s 
development […]. 
 (Yoder 2001: 20)  
The government supported the status quo, as it feared that regional reforms would 
mean a loss of influence, and thus none of the reform proposals acquired 
sufficient support in the parliament (Yoder 2001: 20). 
3.1.1 Deadlock 
The situation was characterized by deadlock. The Czech government, despite the 
Czech Constitution’s call for regional governments and warnings from the EU 
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Commission that regional planning competences was required by all member 
states, was reluctant to transfer power from national to regional level. The 
domestic political actors were parted by ideological differences regarding the role 
of democracy and the role of citizens in politics; emphasizing either the political 
parties and the national-authority or the importance of local democracy. These 
differences continued to put strain on the regional reform process (Yoder 2001: 
21f.). Hence, the deadlock did not come apart at once. But, when it did it was 
allegedly with EU requirements playing a pivotal role (Jacoby and Černoch 2002: 
10).  
After the formal application for membership in 1996, the Czech Republic began 
establishing an institutional infrastructure for regional policy. This happened after 
intensive EU pressure (Baun 2002: 267f). According to Yoder, the Czech 
government, under Klaus, reacted very angrily against what it saw as direct 
outside pressure, from the EU, to carry out regional reforms (Yoder 2001: 21). 
Nevertheless this pressure as it was formulated in official EU documents led to the 
establishment of the Czech Ministry of Regional Development (MRD) in 
November 1996. The main task of the MRD is to implement regional 
development policy and to coordinate and prepare the National Regional 
Development Plan (NDP), which is a multi-annual programming document for 
EU pre-accession and Structural Funds aid (Baun 2002: 267f.). But, the creation 
of the MRD was also a part of a cabinet reshuffle following the June 1996 re-
election of the Klaus government, and the MRD became a weak ministry because 
it; 
  
[…] had significant competence only with regard to the desolate housing 
situation in the country, thus earning it the nickname of "housing ministry 
 (Jacoby and Černoch 2002: 9).  
 
The Czech Republic had formally applied for membership of the EU in January 
1996, this was answered by the European Commission in its July 1997 ‘Opinion 
on the Czech Republic’s application for EU membership’, which declared that the 
Czech Republic lacked a necessary independent regional development policy, 
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which should be separate of the national development policy, the Commission 
went on and stated that; 
 
 [c]urrently, the Czech Republic has no regional policy. Indeed, regional 
development initiatives are implemented through sectoral policies at national 
level. 
 (Commission 1997: 83).  
 
Even though much of the criticism from the EU was due to the reluctant 
implementation speed of the Klaus government, the Commission acknowledged 
the set-up of the MRD. The report concluded that the financial fundament of the 
MRD for regional investment however was not yet present, and it was thus not 
possible to establish the necessary capacity for EU financed projects (Commission 
1997: 81ff).  
Apparently the opinion from the EU started new domestic discussions among 
politicians about the need for a regional policy. The MRD saw itself as the 
organization responsible for the preparation of the structural funds, but it had a 
weak voice in the Klaus government. However, in the subsequent period some 
interesting initiatives came from outside the government, more precisely from 
actors who had gained experience with working with Phare: The Commission 
Delegation in Prague who was responsible for the coordination of the Phare 
programmes (Jacoby and Černoch 2002: 11), and who due to a reform of Phare in 
1997 got an increased role in supervising the implementation of the EU-
programmes (Bailey and De Propris 2004: 80-82), and were actively searching for 
partners for implementing the funds. Here though it becomes difficult to 
differentiate external influence from domestic politics. In its search for partners to 
implement Phare programs of regional and public administrative reform, the 
Delegation chose to focus more on The National Training Fund (NTF), under the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs instead of the MRD. The NTF was relatively 
independent from the inflexible hierarchy of the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs, and the reason why the Commission Delegation turned its attention in this 
direction seems to have been due to the lack of enthusiasm and the low priority 
that the Klaus government had displayed with regard to regional policy and the 
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MRD (Jacoby and Černoch 2002: 11). This started an erosion of the domestic 
deadlock through more informal channels, which were more independent from the 
priorities of the government than the formal channel – the MRD. Even though, the 
erosion of the deadlock, which had started with the Commission’s Opinion and 
the initiatives of the Delegation, it was apparently not of big concern to the Klaus 
government as long as it was firmly in power. But, by the late 1997 the situation 
changed dramatically, when the Klaus government had to resign due to corruption 
allegations. Josef Tošovský, the former Director of the Central Bank, was 
appointed as temporary Prime Minister, by President Havel, until the general 
election in June 1998. While the temporary government under Tošovský only 
ruled for six months, it paved the way for reforms and ended the deadlock of 
administrative reforms and regional policy (Jacoby and Černoch 2002: 12).  
3.1.2 Creation of the new regions 
Most importantly and despite the early political opposition towards 
decentralization, 14 self-governing regional authorities, between the level of the 
local and the central state, were created in December 1997, with the approval of 
the ‘Constitutional Act on the Formation of the Regions’ (Baun 2002: 269). 
Tošovský’s interim government played a major role in the approval of the act 
(Jacoby and Černoch 2002: 12). This was a crucial step in the preparation for EU 
regional policy and a major step towards fulfilling the obligations of Article 99 of 
the constitution, as the elected bodies of the regions were identified as important 
future partners of the Commission and the national government in the planning 
and implementation of EU regional policy. As another important step the Czech 
government had to classify its newly created regions as territorial units in relation 
to EUROSTAT’s ‘system of statistical classification’, known as NUTS (la 
Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques). According to this 
classification-system the 14 Czech regions are specified as NUTS III territorial 
units, however they were grouped together to form eight new NUTS II units, 
which are the basic units eligible for aid from the Structural Funds, and thus the 
primary domains of  a greater part of EU’s regional policies. The NUTS II 
regional councils incorporated the Regional Coordination Committees of the 
NUTS III, and hence would become responsible for securing assistance from the 
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Structural Funds and the appointment of a monitoring unit to the programmes 
after the implementation of the new regions (Baun 2002: 269).  
 
The regions are territorial communities with a decentralized administration. The 
regional assembly is the supreme body and is democratically elected; the 
assembly elects the members of the regional council, which is the executive body 
of each region. The council carries out the decisions of the assembly and draws up 
documents and proposals for their meetings. The regions exercise the powers 
delegated to them by the national ministries or the responsibilities of their own; 
these are however not listed, and an issue of much uncertainty and dispute. All of 
the regions will have the same amount of power, responsibilities and autonomy. 
But, no one has any legislative power, only executive authority (CLRAE 2000). 
However, in 2000, they gained the authority to subsidize municipalities and 
associations in the region along with issuing regional by-laws (Yoder 2001: 21). 
The central government has no extraordinary interference supremacy with 
regional affairs. However, after the districts were abolished, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs has assumed the review of the regions’ legal compliance, with the 
power to suspend but not cancel decisions of the regions (CLRAE 2000). The new 
regional authorities were, according to the ‘Constitutional Act on the Formation of 
the Regions’ of 1997, to be elected and take effect on 1 January 2000, but this was 
delayed until 2001 due to the lack of implementation of necessary legislation. In 
the interim period the local government continued to be the responsibility of the 
districts (Baun 2002: 269 and Yoder 2001: 21ff.). 
 
Despite the apparent EU influence on the creation of the new regions the number 
of regions exceeded the necessary for the purpose of the EU regional policy. This 
seems to have been partly due to the influence of domestic political actors at the 
local and national level, who tried to maximize their own political standing by 
trying to create more political positions or by trying to inflate the political power 
of the regions (Baun 2002: 269). Additionally, there was a widespread fear among 
the political elite, stemming from the experiences of the Velvet Divorce, the 
breakup of Yugoslavia and the recent dissolving of the Soviet Union, that regional 
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differentiation would increase and national unity would suffer and that the 
historical regions of Silesia and Moravia would grow more independent and 
perhaps someday seek full federalization or even separation (Baun 2002: 274 and 
Yoder 2001: 21). According to a 1991 census, 1.4 million inhabitants preferred 
nationality of either Moravia or Silesia to nationality of the Czech Republic. Even 
though, this was primarily a manifestation against the totalitarianism and the 
insensitive centralization of the communist rule, it spurred a lasting fear in the 
central administration for separatist movements (Danek 1993). This fear meant 
that the regional lines were drawn across traditional historical lines, in an attempt 
to stop any nascent independence movements and reduce past tensions among 
regions (Baun 2002: 268f).  
3.1.3 Alignment 
By March 1998 however the Czech Republic had committed itself to adopting the 
entire Acquis Communautaire, where the development of an institutional capacity 
for EU regional policy was a key goal, setting and incorporating many short- and 
medium-term goals. The election of a Social Democratic government in June 
1998, under Prime Minister Miloš Zeman, cemented the dialogue with the 
Commission on the critical parts of the Commission’s 1997 opinion (Jacoby and 
Černoch 2002: 12). The Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) has traditionally taken a 
pro-European stance, based on an idea of an EU that pays attention to social issues 
via e.g. the Social Charter (Rovna 2002: 208). The Czech Republic thus aligned 
its regional policy with the requirements of EU structural policy in April 1998, 
which called for the establishment of a regional development policy and 
legislation by 1999. Thus in October 1999 the first National Development Plan 
(NDP) was approved and updated vision dispatched to the Commission in June 
2001. This led to the establishment of the Regional Development Act in June 
2000, which ensured the administrative basis for the Czech regional policy, and 
thus defined the authoritative competences at national, regional and local levels 
(Baun 2002: 268).  
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3.1.4 The role of mediating factors in the preparation for regional policy 
This paragraph will conclude on the central findings of the chapter as they pertain 
to our theory on the role of mediating factors. As mentioned numerous times 
above, the role and policy preferences of the Klaus government have been 
distinguished by reluctance to reform and strict administrative centralization. 
Moreover, its policy preferences have been characterized by a high degree of 
rigidity in towards regional reform proposals, from the EU and domestic political 
opponents, have been met with unwillingness. Hence, radical changes in regional 
policies did not happen in the Czech Republic during the Klaus administration’s 
rule, with the exception of the ratification of the Constitution. The Klaus 
government thus constituted a significant veto-point. The government had very 
few aspirations on consensual agreements with regards to decentralization, which 
only happened when forced through either by the EU or domestic opponents; the 
domestic political culture was conflictual and dominated by domestic quarrels. 
Europeanization of the regional policy was throughout the beginning of the 1990s 
a process portrayed by inertia, as the Klaus government chose to maintain the 
status quo of the inherited centralist policy tradition and did not try to comply 
with the EU requirements for regional policy. This was partly due to the salience 
put on the regional policy area, and the perceived risk of engaging in profound 
decentralization. This was perceived as a very tangible risk of eroding national 
unity, paving the way for future separations of the state, and the loss of influence 
in the central government. However, the process of Europeanization changed 
gradually in the course of the few reforms the Czech government reluctantly 
applied. These changes were nevertheless non-fundamental, the creation of the 
MRD illustrates this; it was set-up to be the central institution for implementation 
of aid-programs, but was systematically neglected. This indicated that the degree 
of Europeanization in the Czech Republic at this stage, around 1996-1997 was in 
Börzel & Risse’s terms only absorption; The Czech policies were adapted to meet 
EU requirements but, it did not represent a major change of the direction in 
government policies. 
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The importance of the Klaus government as a veto-point becomes decisively 
visible after its resignation in 1997, when the transitional government managed to 
end the domestic political stalemate and pave the way for reforms in just six 
months. This demonstrated that an advocacy network, bound together by the 
shared belief that democracy was best preserved through local-democracy, which 
preferred the EU’s design for regional policy to the Czech government’s, had 
matured to overcome the national constraint to change that the veto-point of the 
Klaus government had been. The period after the resignation of the Klaus 
government is chiefly characterized by the change in policy preference embracing 
the EU’s regional policy. In this period of the late 1990s the scale and speed of 
reforms increased, and the level of Europeanization was greater than before, e.g. 
the MRD was significantly improved after repeating years of criticism through the 
Commission’s Regular Reports. In the following chapter we will follow the line 
of EU influence by investigating the EU requirements thoroughly.  
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4 EU’s regional policies and pre-accession aid  
In this chapter we will analyse the EU Regional Policy, which is the major EU-
variable that could have had an influence on the Czech processes of adapting to 
the criteria for membership regarding regional policies, which we have accounted 
for in the previous chapter. By doing this we will explore the conditions the EU 
required the Czech Republic to fulfil in the pre-accession negotiations, especially 
with regards to regional policy. By accounting for this intervening variable we 
will e.g. illustrate the uncertainty built into the process, and the pressure that the 
EU put on the Czech Republic. The EU’s regional policy towards the candidate 
states basically had two legs: the negotiations evolving around the requirements of 
the Acquis chapter on regional policy, and the conditions attached to pre-
accession aid through funds like Phare etc. The aim of the regional policy is 
basically to reduce regional economic disparities and to promote a more socially 
cohesive Europe. 
4.1 Monitoring of the Czech development - from application to 
accession 
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 some of the first formal ties between the 
EU and the CEECs were the Europe Agreements, which in broad terms prescribed 
the terms for the CEECs’ access to the Internal Market and Phare-funding under 
the condition that they aligned central parts of their legislation with the EU 
provisions. The first agreement the EU signed were with Poland and Hungary in 
1991 and in 1993 the Czech Republic signed the Europe Agreements with the EU 
(Commission 1994: 7).   
In June 1993 at the Copenhagen Summit the EU member states declared that 
CEECs who wished to become a part of the EU should have the opportunity to 
join the Union. During the early negotiations for the accession of the CEECs into 
the European Union, the criteria for membership were not very clearly outlined. 
Some of the first conditions for membership were formulated at the Copenhagen 
Summit in 1993, hence called the Copenhagen Criteria, these consist of four 
elements; the first criteria outlined that membership could only be achieved if 
  
49 
certain political institutional features were in place e.g. democracy, rule of law 
and human rights. Secondly, the candidate countries had to have a functioning 
market economy, which could stand being exposed to the market forces inside the 
EU. Thirdly, the candidate countries had to implement the Acquis 
Communautaire. The fourth criterion concerned the capacity to absorb new 
members in the EU; this should be developed simultaneous with the enlargement 
so there would not be a negative influence on the overall European integration. 
Thus, this fourth criterion basically refers to EU’s absorptive capacity, which 
ended up having large implications for the Union’s enlargement strategy. (Council 
1993: 12) 
 
The requirement to have an institutional framework, which can support the 
implementation of the Acquis, is the most interesting criterion for our case. The 
Copenhagen criteria did not go into detail with what exactly this institutional 
framework meant for the candidate countries. After the Czech Republic’s official 
application for membership of the EU, the Commission started monitoring the 
progress in annual progress reports. 
The official response to the formal application for membership came in July 1997 
with the ‘Commission Opinion on the Czech Republic’s Application for Membership of 
the European Union’, which was a part of the Agenda 2000. Agenda 2000 was the 
Commission’s overall proposal for managing enlargement, which also entailed a 
revision of the sustainability of the Structural Funds in light of the anticipated 
enlargement (Allen 2005: 222). The Agenda 2000 report on the Czech readiness 
to join the Union was divided into many sub-chapters, one of these dealt with 
regional and cohesion policy. In the report the Commission stated that: 
“Currently, the Czech Republic has no regional policy [and] lacks an independent 
regional development policy.” (Commission 1997: 83)  
In order for the Czech Republic to be able to achieve acceptable progress on the 
regional policy area the Commission urged the Czechs to “[…] establish a legal, 
administrative and budgetary framework” which could help implement the 
required Acquis on this area (Commission 1997: 84). 
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In 1998 the first Accession Partnership-agreement for the Czech Republic was 
adopted, the purpose was to clarify how the Czech Republic could implement the 
Acquis and create the necessary basis for receiving pre-accession funds such as 
Phare. The Accession Partnership was built on the proposals made by the Agenda 
2000-report. In this agreement a prioritised list of short and medium term goals 
was presented, the short term goals concerned the areas where the Czech Republic 
could settle or make acceptable progress before or during 2000. The medium 
termed goals should be fulfilled at the latest in 2003. The Accession Partnership-
agreement has been amended three times, in December 1999, November 2000 and 
in 2002 (Commission 2004 and Council Decision (98/267/EC)).    
4.1.1 Regular reports 
The progress of the Czech Republic, and the monitoring of goals outlined in the 
Accession Partnership, was continued by the Commission in the annual Regular 
reports. The first Regular Report was published in 1998; in this report the 
Commission complimented the Czech Republic for the good progress it had 
achieved in the area of regional policy since the Agenda 2000-report (Commission 
1998: 30). But, it also emphasized that the progress was only a step in the right 
direction and further steps needed to be taken in order to consolidate the status of 
the Czech regional policy. Furthermore, the reform process needed to be speeded 
up. One of the measures the report referred to was the establishment of the 
Ministry for Regional Development (MRD), founded in November 1996, which 
was responsible for organising the national regional policy in order for it to 
correspond with the EU-legislation. The Ministry was also responsible for the 
necessary inter-ministerial co-ordination needed in the area. These were the 
formal competences of the MRD, but as we have accounted for in the previous 
chapter, the Ministry was very weak and had limited responsibilities and capacity. 
Another point of progress, which the Commission highlighted, was the 
parliamentary decision on establishing 14 regions. The final improvement 
highlighted by the Commission was the Czech Government’s actions towards 
establishment of a regional development strategy in 1999; one of the tasks that the 
MRD was given (Commission 1998: 30ff). 
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Further, the Commission criticized the financial basis for implementing regional 
policy for being too limited and causing the financial background for monitoring 
and controlling the process to receive too few funds (Commission 1998, 30). 
When looking at the administrative capacity the Commission emphasised, very 
limited development towards reform of the public administration, with regards to 
implementation of the Acquis, had taken place (Commission 1998: 36). Regarding 
the Regional policy-area the Commission did not find that the amount of 
personnel attending MRD’s field of responsibilities, which involved preparation 
of the Czech Republic to participate in the Structural Funds, to be sufficient. 
(Commission 1998: 40).     
 
In the Regular Report of 1999 it was stated that in 1998 the Czech Republic 
adopted the legislation ‘the Principles of Regional Policy’ together with an 
institutional framework to cope with the implementation of regional policy. As a 
result of this a governmental decree divided the Czech Republic into 8 NUTS-II-
regions in accordance with EUROSTAT’s classification system. Despite that the 
Commission earlier in the report had emphasised that many new initiatives had 
been taken and the administrative capacity had been increased, it still emphasised 
that the Czech Republic did not have the necessary tools for the budgetary aspects 
related to the Structural funds. (Commission 1999b: 48) Once more the 
Commission expressed its concern about the amount of personnel employed in the 
MRD and also about the lack of a “[…] comprehensive internal financial control 
system” (Commission 1999b: 48). In the Regular Report of 1999 the Commission 
concluded that the Czech Republic had made satisfactory progress in pursuing the 
essential structures needed to secure regional and structural policy, but that there 
still needed to be made further progress, e.g. in the legislative framework, which 
had to be fully operational (Commission 1999b: 77). Also the administrative 
capacity of the MRD had to be increased in order for it to fulfil its obligations 
concerning the preparation of the Czech legislation to meet the EU’s regional 
policy (Commission 1999b: 48). In addition, the Commission recognized that 
there had been made acceptable progress in the regional policy and cohesion 
areas, with regards to preparing the Czech Republic for participation in EU-
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structural policy. But, the progress regarding optimization of the financial, 
monitoring and control procedures and the preparations of the legislative 
framework was happening at a too slow pace. This was a very distinctive feature 
of the Czech Republic’s reform process; progress was happening but the speed of 
the reforms was to slow (Commission 1999b: 48). From a critical point of view 
one could say that it was maybe more a distinct feature of the Commission’s style 
of monitoring, that the Czechs were praised for their progress but at the same time 
they were urged to try even harder.  
 
In the report of 1999, compliance with the Acquis on regional and cohesion policy 
was categorises as a medium-term priority, this meant that the Acquis in the area 
of regional policy had to be implemented before 2003 (Commission 1999b: 81ff).  
 
The Accession Partnership agreement was re-evaluated in 1999 and it stated that 
the Czech Republic had made progress in meeting the requirements of 
membership, and thus the EU would continue to assist the Czech Republic with 
pre-accession aid though the programs of PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD 
(Commission 1999a: 13). 
 
In the Regular Report of 2000 the membership criteria were divided into a number 
of chapters, originally the number was 28 but was later extended to 31. The 
chapters should make it easier to grasp the different aspects of the EU’s 
conditions; the regional policy requirements were now turned into chapter 21. The 
Commission noted, in the regular report of 2000, that there had been some 
progress; the Czech Republic’s co-ordination and programming capacity had been 
improved due to an increase in the administrative capacity of the institution 
responsible for these areas (Commission 2000: 80).  The progress was a 
consequence of the drafting of the Regional Development Act, which created the 
foundation for the division of the administrative responsibilities between national, 
regional and local levels (Baun 2002: 268). However, the Commission stated that 
despite signs of progress in the regional policy area, the Czech Republic should 
still try to increase the administrative capacity in the relevant institutions, both at 
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central and regional level. The Commission suggested that the strengthening 
should be achieved by an increase of staff and the education of them, in particular 
through skills training. (Commission 2000: 81). The Commission also advised 
that the civil service law had to be brought up to date, in order to improve the 
conditions for civil servants and hence their work ethics, otherwise it could 
undermine the work in the Ministry of Regional Development. On top of this, the 
Commission warned that the low level of the employees’ wages, in the MRD, had 
to be improved to reduce the risk of loosing the skilled employees to better paid 
jobs elsewhere, also this could undermine the work of the Ministry. (Commission 
2000: 81) The Commission emphasized that the development regarding the 
preparation for the Structural Funds was good; however the communication 
between the regional and central levels could be better. Also the co-ordination 
between different ministries was still not up to par (Commission 2000: 81). In the 
2000 regular report the Commission concluded that with regards to regional 
policy the Czech Republic, had made several improvements:  
 
[…] territorial organisation is in line with EC classification, a new Act regulates 
regional development and the institutional framework has been clarified. 
(Commission 2000: 104). 
 
In the regular report from 2001 it was stated that the basic legislation in the Czech 
Republic for the compliance with the criteria, outlined by the EU, was very close 
to be present. But, there were still some improvements to be made, the Czech 
Republic was still lacking some operational bodies, which could help improve and 
expand the administrative capacity and to support the needed inter-ministerial co-
ordination. One of the most important aspects of the Commission’s 
recommendations was that the administrative capacity would be able to manage 
the structural funds; the implementation and the running of it on a daily basis. The 
main aspect of the recommendation was the need for initiatives that would make it 
easier to make the structural funds work in the Czech Republic after accession. 
All of these proposals concerned administrative capacity (Commission 2001: 81f).  
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The Regular Report from October 2002 acknowledged that the requirement 
outlined by chapter 21 had been met, and the chapter was officially closed, in fact 
negotiations on chapter 21 were closed already in April 2002 (Hughes et al. 2004: 
528). This meant that the Czech Republic officially had fulfilled all of their 
obligations and complied with EU requirements to its regional policy. However, 
the Commission warned that further reinforcement was needed regarding; 
 
[…] their administrative capacity, [the] inter-ministerial co-operation and 
partnership, and [the] systems and procedures for effective monitoring, financial 
management and control.  
(Commission 2002: 104) 
 
This has been the standard method used by the Commission in their reports from 
1998 onwards on the progress made by the Czech Republic: First, the 
Commission acknowledges and compliments the progress, which has been made 
during the past year, and then it continues by criticizing the developments on 
perceived areas that need improvement.  
4.2 Phare and the pre-accession funds 
The second part of the EU pre-accession strategy, with focus on regional policies, 
was the Phare along with other pre-accession funds, which provided funding for 
restructuring the CEEC economies from planned to market economy. In 1998 the 
funds were refocused in order to help the candidate countries implement the 
Acquis and to prepare them for structural and cohesion funding after the entrance 
into the Union, and they were turned into actual pre-accession funds. Thus, the 
funds represented an important mechanism of Europeanization, however from a 
broad European perspective it was not able to deliver in terms of regional 
institutional building and preparing the CEECs for structural funding upon 
accession. This is what we will account for in this sub-chapter. 
 
Phare (Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring of the Economy) is an 
EU fund, which was initially created in 1989 to help Poland and Hungary 
reconstruct their economies in the wake of the recent dissolutions of the 
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communist regimes. However it was soon extended to apply to most CEECs, even 
though the name was not adapted to the extended list of new recipients. From 
1989 until 1998, when the focus and procedures of Phare were redefined, the 
funds were mainly demand driven, in the sense that it reacted to requests for help 
from CEE governments. It covered 15 sectors and mainly provided technical 
assistance for government and ministry officials in areas as different as public 
finance, agriculture, environment, privatization and educational infrastructure. 
The procedures for working with the funds were however criticised for being 
overly rigid, opaque and complex, e.g. the bureaucracy of Phare involved more 
than five layers of documentation, and the Commission retained control of all 
supervision, approval and control procedures, which it basically did not have the 
capacity to cope with. On top of this the broad scope of the 15 focal sectors, 
provided that the achievements of Phare were at best fragmented by too many 
small projects, and basically it did not bring about the changes it set out to 
support. It caused the contracting rates to be very poor. In 1997 it was as low as 
10% of the total commitments in some areas, which was of course unacceptable 
for the Commission. Another illustration of the relatively limited capability and 
impact of foreign aid to the CEECs can be seen in the fact that Phare was awarded 
quite limited budgets compared to other EU funds, and either way it actually 
provided the greater part of foreign assistance to the CEECs. (Bailey and De 
Propris 2004: 78-80) 
4.2.1 Refocusing Phare 
Because of the increasing critique of the operations of Phare, and in light of the 
enlargement process, which at this point in time had been put on firm tracks, the 
Commission, in 1997, initiated a series of changes to the procedures and 
objectives of the fund. One procedural change was to integrate the operation of 
the fund into national government structures, another was to abandon the five 
layers of documentation to replace it with the Accession Partnerships, which was 
to be followed up by an annual financing proposal, setting the terms and 
timetables for the projects and contracts. The reform also gave the Commission 
Delegations in the candidate states an increased role in the supervision of projects. 
Another vital procedural change which is linked to the objectives was the shift to 
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the additionality or co-funding principle, which meant that Phare would only fund 
projects which also were partly funded by the government or other sources 
(Bailey and De Propris 2004: 80-82). This is a principle, which has applied to 
EU’s Structural funds for Regional Policy - which only applies to existing 
members - since a major reform of these funds was carried out in 1988 (Bailey 
and De Propris 2002). This principle potentially has a large effect on national 
policies, since it demands the allocation of national funds, thus potentially 
changing or guiding government priorities (Grabbe 2003: 314). Furthermore 
Phare was now introduced as the main financial instrument to help candidates 
prepare for membership. The objectives thus became accession-driven, focussing 
on the priorities set out in each candidate’s Accession Partnership, which was 
evaluated in the regular reports referred to above. However upon the 1997 Phare-
reform the Commission was further criticised for poor documentation of the value 
for money of the projects, and for retaining the annual programming, which would 
eventually not help the candidates prepare for the implementation of the Structural 
funds, which operates with multi-annual-programming. (Bailey and De Propris 
2004: 80ff) 
 
Partly as a response to this criticism the Commission once again reformed and 
refocused Phare in 2000. To meet the requirements of Agenda 2000, two more 
financial instruments were introduced alongside Phare in order to prepare the 
candidates for implementing EU Structural funds and policies upon accession. 
These were ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-accession) and 
SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agricultural and Rural 
Development), and these three pre-accession funds now actually each had a big 
brother in the well-established EU funds: Phare corresponded with and prepared 
the candidates for the Structural funds, ISPA for the Cohesion fund and SAPARD 
was meant to prepare the candidates for the guidance sections of the CAP 
(Common Agricultural Policy). On top of this the funds were awarded more funds 
and 1/3 of the increased Phare budget now was assigned to co-funding institution-
building, 1/3 were allocated for aid in the implementation of the Acquis, and the 
last third was aimed at developing mechanisms and institutions to implement the 
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Structural funds upon accession. The Commission also changed the approach 
from ex ante control of the projects and programmes, to a more ex post evaluation 
approach, which resembles the operation of the Structural funds more. However 
the operations of Phare was criticised for not delivering in terms of preparing the 
candidates for structural funding after entering the Union, e.g. Phare was still too 
centralised to resemble the Structural funds, monitoring and evaluation was poor, 
and the multi-annual-programming aspect was not fully implemented fast enough. 
In sum Phare did not manage to create the absorptive capacity in the candidate 
countries that it aimed at. (Bailey and De Propris 2004: 83ff) 
4.2.2 Four Conditions for Structural Funding 
The capacity to absorb the structural funds mainly refers to their ability to live up 
to the conditions for structural funding. After the Structural Funds went through a 
major reform in 1988 there has been four conditions for the countries and regions 
applying for funds: programming, concentration, additionality and partnership. 
Programming means that the national governments should prepare programming 
documents providing objectives and timetables for the implementation of the 
funds. Concentration means that projects should be concentrated on some few 
well described national objectives that fall within the common objectives. 
Additionality or co-funding, means that the funds will only partly fund projects, 
national funds should also be allocated to the projects. And finally partnership 
implies that relevant partners at the national or subnational level should be 
involved in the planning and implementation phase of the projects, thus the 
partnership principle is also referred to as the way the subsidiarity principle has 
been incorporated into the operation of the funds. The co-funding requirement has 
been touched upon above, but the partnership principle has also been held to have 
very broad implications for member states, especially the one without a well 
developed tier of regional government. This is because in order to receive 
structural funding, there has to be national partners at more than the level of 
central government, which means that if regional institutions capable of 
participating in EU-projects do not exist they will have to be established, in order 
for the country to benefit from the funds. After the 1988 reform of the funds this 
initially increased the cross-European regional disparities, because countries with 
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poor institutional capacity at the regional level, most prominently Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, failed to successfully implement the funds, whereas member 
states with longer traditions of decentralised local and regional administration had 
higher success rates. Thus the funds actually obtained almost the opposite of what 
was the intention, at least in the short run. (Bailey and De Propris 2002b) 
4.2.3 Limited success 
These design problems of the Phare programme was also illustrated by the limited 
success of one of the key instruments to support institution building; twinning. 
Twinning is partly a horizontal mechanism since it involves the posting of civil 
servants from member states to a candidate country, where they should cooperate 
with national civil servants on different projects, basically with the aim of 
exchanging knowledge about working with EU-funded projects and requirements 
etc. The institutional structures and policy priorities of the candidates however 
severely limited the success of this measure. E.g. the public administration of the 
candidates were in a state of flux, meaning that there were limited continuity in 
the work of civil servants, thus there were little accumulation of experience and 
knowledge. Furthermore twinning activities were down-prioritised financially, 
which meant that civil servants from the CEEC often had to engage in knowledge 
exchange and trans-European projects, on top of doing their normal jobs, which 
naturally meant a low dedication to the twinning activities. This combined with 
the general low morale and the low salaries for civil servants in CEEC; did not 
create the best conditions for knowledge exchange or accumulation, which was 
needed in order to build institutional capability. All in all this deficiency, which 
was basically a case of failed system design, meant that only the richest and most 
developed candidates, managed to take advantage of the twinning measure, which 
basically increased the relative disparities between rich and poor developed 
regions further. An illustration of the limited capacity to engage in twinning 
projects is illustrated by the fact that between 1998 and 2002 the Czech republic 
were only engaged in 3 Phare Twinning Projects, with a focus on regional 
development and preparations to structural funds, simply because the Czech 
Republic lacked the regional institutions, and thus also the civil servants to be 
educated and prepared for structural funding. (Bailey and De Propris 2004: 86-88) 
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One implication of the approach taken by the EU with the pre-accession funds 
aimed at building institutional capacity, is that institutional capacity basically 
takes a long time to generate and can barely be imposed top-down. A large 
capacity in terms of formal institutions, office buildings, computers, employees 
etc. can relatively easy by achieved within a short period of time, if there is 
political will to do so. But what is basically needed, in order to properly 
participate as a partner in EU-projects, is institutional capability in addition to 
capacity. Capability is thus a much more complex feature entailing the 
institutions’ ability to actually perform the tasks they were created to perform, 
which requires a sufficient amount of human capital (Bailey and De Propris 2004: 
88 and 2002a: 318) Thus this is basically a sociological institutionalism 
explanation of change, because institutional changes take time and happens 
through complex processes of socialisation and learning-by-doing. However a 
change in policy priorities can be the first step to a more profound institutional 
capability building. But the ambitions of Phare and the other pre-accession funds 
were somehow too optimistic in terms of the speed that the changes were intended 
to happen in (Bailey and De Propris 2004: 90). 
4.3 Pressure and uncertainty 
Arguably the EU’s influence on domestic regional policies potentially has been 
great, mainly because the conditions of the EU on the regional policy endorse 
change in the territorial relations in the member states by requiring the existence 
of political independent regional authorities. To measure the degree of influence 
EU has had on the regional policies of the Czech Republic it is important to assess 
the level of regional policy prior to the application for membership. When we 
look at the Czech Republic, from the perspective of the official EU reports, there 
seems to be a very high degree of misfit. In the first report from 1998, especially 
with regards to the lack of regional territorial division, it was stated that there 
were no self-governing regions. Nevertheless, this situation changed during the 
enlargement process with the creation of the regions with the necessary self-
governing administrative capacity and the demand for capacity building of the 
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administration in order to meet the requirements of the Structural Funds. 
However, this development in the Czech Republic towards the fulfilment of the 
formal requirements on the area of regional policy, did not keep the Commission 
from finding new areas in the Czech regional policy, which had to be improved. 
In this way the Commission basically continuously constructed the perception of a 
misfit, which enabled it to apply further pressure on the Czech regional policies. 
Whether a misfit existed in absolute terms or not, is very difficult for us to assess, 
but following Radaelli’s argument; that the level of fit will always be discursively 
and socially constructed and as such it is not an objective measure (2004: 7), we 
argue that the Commission has used its capability to strategically construct the 
impression of a misfit, in order to create adaptational pressures. Through that 
pressure the Commission has been able to influence Czech internal policies. 
 
This was so even in the regular report from 2002 which was published after the 
negotiations on this chapter were closed. And in the monitoring report from 2003, 
which was published after the negotiations on the Czech membership of the EU 
were concluded in December 2002, and the Czech signing of the Treaty of 
Accession in April 2003. Thus some of the adaptational pressure must have 
decreased, since the political statements and conclusions almost irrevocably 
approved the Czech membership. However since monitoring is also a powerful 
governance tool, albeit softer than gate-keeping, the Commission continued to 
apply pressure on the candidates. 
 
The conditions for the candidate countries in this round of enlargement were more 
wide-ranging than ever before and in this process there has been a high degree of 
uncertainty concerning the requirements of the Acquis (Grabbe 2003: 319). 
Between 1993 and 1998 the degree of uncertainty concerning the policy agenda 
was very high because the Copenhagen Criteria was imprecisely formulated and it 
seemed like an impossible task to implement the whole Acquis, there was no 
model that could explain where the candidate countries should start or end the 
implementation (Grabbe 2003: 319). In the negotiations between the EU and the 
candidate countries the Commission emphasized that if the candidate countries 
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did not show sufficient progress the pre-accession aid would be taken from them, 
but it was not clearly stated what a sufficient progress referred to (Grabbe 2003: 
319). The 1998 Accession Partnership tried to overcome some of this uncertainty. 
This was primarily done by dividing the Acquis into sub-categories and by 
prioritising the conditions into medium and short term goals. But, the regional 
policy was still weakly defined, it was not specifically explained how the 
requirements should be met and there were no direct guidelines for what the 
structure should be for receiving Structural and Cohesion Funds. Thus the 
Commission often resorted to what in Hughes et al.’s terms was informal 
conditionality, which meant that the Commission officials often had to make their 
own interpretation, in order to put real content and meaning into the formal 
requirements. This provided for a huge uncertainty about what the required 
measures actually were and when and how to implement them, which was 
reinforced by the fact that the different DGs in the Commission had contradicting 
views on what the regional policy requirements meant. For instance Hughes et al. 
have explored how the informal requirements for regional institutional capacity 
building has changed over time, so in the beginning of the enlargement process 
regionalisation was interpreted in the direction of independent self-governing 
regional authorities with democratically elected councils. While later in the 
process the Commission went more in the direction of seeing government 
controlled administrative agencies, as being a sufficient regional tier to implement 
the Structural Funds upon accession. (Hughes et al. 2004). The fact that there is 
room for domestic manoeuvres within the EU-requirements can of course be seen 
as a direct outcome of the EU’s urge to accommodate many different models into 
the community, and to honour the principle of subsidiarity. But on the other hand 
it also gave the Commission a large room for strategic/creative manoeuvres in 
order to apply the strongest possible pressure on the candidates. 
 
Thus we have seen a long range of mechanisms applied to the regional policy area 
in the enlargement process. A central feature has been the requirement to 
implement certain European models, even though chapter 21 on regional policies 
were characterised by a thin Acquis of ill-specified requirements, the informal 
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conditions have provided some models to implement in the candidate states. Phare 
and the other pre-accession funds had provided money and technical assistance to 
the candidates in order for them to build the capacity and routines to implement 
the Acquis and to receive structural funding. Through the whole process the 
Commission has monitored and benchmarked the achievements of the candidates, 
in regular reports which have been an effective entrance into domestic politics of 
the candidates. Advice and twinning has been a central measure of the Phare 
programmes, which although promising, does not seem to have been able to 
deliver sufficiently in terms of accumulation of human capital and knowledge 
leading to institutional capability. The gate-keeping power of the Commission at 
first sight seems to have been a vital background for the relative pressures the 
Commission could put on the candidates. However the fact that the reporting 
strategy used by the Commission only changed slightly after the Czech accession 
had been approved, gives the impression that the power asymmetry with the 
Commission having the upper hand and the CEECs with the lower hand is even 
deeper rooted in the structures of the EU than what it prima facie appears to be. 
Or as an Estonian official bluntly has characterised it “[…] the Commission ‘saw 
candidate countries as mice in laboratories… anything could be asked of them’” 
(Hughes et al. 2004: 537). 
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5 Conclusive analysis 
In this final chapter we will first try to summarize the findings of the previous two 
chapters, upon which we will discuss a counterfactual argument assessing the 
relative importance of EU requirements. Hereby we will be able to conclude on 
our cardinal question.  
5.1 Four phases of adjustment 
The transformation process of the Czech regional policy has, since the collapse of 
communism in 1989, been affected significantly by Europeanization and domestic 
mediating factors. 
The initial period from 1989 till the ratification of the Czech constitution in 1993 
was primarily characterized by domestic reluctance to regional reform and strict 
centralization of regional policy. There were no direct pressure from the EU nor 
any Europeanization at this point, and the regional policy of the Czech Republic 
was centralized further with the abolishment of the regions in 1990. This initial 
reluctance at domestic level was partly due to the strong policy preferences of the 
very influential Minister of Finance Vaclav Klaus, who saw regional reforms and 
decentralization as a threat for the newly found national unity, and a risk of 
loosing power at central level. The status quo was preferred, as it was national and 
economic stability that had the highest priority, partly stemming from the break-
up of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and from the large separatist movements 
in some of the Czech historical regions. There were no Europeanization in this 
period due to lack of EU pressure, however the development of the regional 
policy was dominated by processes similar to those of inertia and retrenchment, 
which later would make it more difficult for the Czech Republic to align with the 
requirements of the EU regional policy.  
 
The Velvet Divorce and the ratification of the constitution in 1993 started a new 
period for the Czech Republic’s regional policy, which lasted until the general 
election in 1996 with the re-election of the Klaus government. The Czech 
constitution had obligated the government to set-up new regions, which was the 
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cardinal demand from the opposition. The Klaus government was very reluctant to 
issue any regional reforms and tried to sabotage any attempts to reforms from the 
opposition. The regional policy was an issue of very high salience for the 
government and their policy preferences in this area were very steadfast; thus they 
remained to be a significant veto-point against change during their entire rule. 
This meant that the domestic political scene was characterized by conflict and 
quarrels. In the course of the Copenhagen Summit of 1993, all of the CEECs were 
given the opportunity to join the EU; the Czech Republic formally applied for 
membership in 1996. This meant that the conditions of the Copenhagen criteria 
had to be met. These conditions were however blurred by imprecise formulations 
and the lack of specific models for implementation or the set-up of regional 
policy, which caused a significant level of uncertainty. The Klaus government’s 
policy preferences were nevertheless not changed, and it still remained very 
reluctant to implement any reforms. Up to this point the Europeanization of the 
Czech regional policy was characterized by inertia partly due to the policy 
preferences of the government and the uncertainty regarding the conditions of the 
Copenhagen criteria.  
 
This changed after the domestic election of 1996, which saw the re-election of 
Klaus, but this time in a weaker government. Europeanization began as the 
government hesitantly started to implement some reforms, while the pressure from 
the EU grew in the midst of the enlargement process. The most significant reform 
was the set-up of the Ministry for Regional Development. However, the changes 
were non-fundamental, and the creation of the MRD illustrates this; it was set-up 
to be the central institution for implementation of aid-programmes, but due to 
systematic neglect it did not have a high capacity. Even though, Europeanization 
had started it was still very limited, the Klaus government and its policy 
preferences still obstructed reform and the unclear conditions from the EU made 
reform more difficult to implement; the Commission noted in 1997 that the Czech 
Republic lacked a regional policy. Europeanization could at this point only be 
characterized as absorption; changes had occurred but only at a small scale and 
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with little significance, the policies of the central government remained 
unchanged. 
 
With the resignation of the Klaus government in late 1997, the dominant regional 
policy preference changed radically and became pro-EU, which meant that a 
significant veto-point along with distinct policy preferences disappeared from the 
domestic political scene. It was replaced by a transitional government, chosen by 
pro-EU President Havel, which paved the way for numerous reforms of the Czech 
regional policy, among with the creation of new self-governing regions. The lack 
of these aspects had been heavily criticized by the Commission, which started to 
exercise a higher degree of pressure on the Czech Republic with opinions and 
regular reports on the progress of reform starting from 1997. The increased EU-
pressure coincided with the resignation of the Klaus government, and the 
Accession Partnership from 1998, which tried to counter the confusion of the 
previous conditions for membership by a division into chapters. The level of 
Europeanization increased due to the increased adaptational pressure from the EU 
and the change in policy preference of the new central domestic actors, which 
together with a clearer conditionality of EU requirements paved the way for a 
paradigmatic change of Czech regional policy. 
5.2 Counterfactual reasoning 
As anticipated in our research strategy we will try to challenge our findings by 
discussing the question: How would the Czech regional policies have evolved if 
the EU did not have specific regional policy requirements attached to the 
accession criteria and pre-accession funds? This represents a mental 
counterfactual, removing the intervening variable without rewriting history too 
much, while we still stick to the same theoretical assumptions that the rest of our 
analysis is based on. First of all it would be difficult to imagine that the EU 
accession criteria did not entail regional policy requirements, since the objectives 
of reducing regional economic disparities is a very important issue on the 
European political agenda. However if we try to imagine that European 
Integration had not gone much further than market integration, and if the principle 
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of subsidiarity only applied to the national level, then things would probably look 
a bit different. The hard headed opposition towards decentralization that Klaus 
and other leading politicians displayed would have been hard to overcome on their 
own, for domestic advocates of regional self-governance. However after the fall of 
the Klaus government in 1997 the Tošovský and the Zeman governments could 
maybe have initiated reforms that sought to establish a regional tier of self-
government, with reference to the Czech Constitution from 1993. But, since the 
Constitution had not caused any changes in regional government structures so far, 
it is not likely that it would have provided a sufficient platform for the national 
advocates of decentralization to exploit. It is also hard to imagine which domestic 
factors that could have been able to severely affect the preferences of the Czech 
political elite. The fear of potential demands for a full scale federalization, from 
especially movements from the historic regions Moravia and Silesia, which could 
mean another break up of national unity, was simply too strong. Furthermore there 
seems to have been widespread agreement that the re-organization of the economy 
and the task of ensuring economic stability could best be managed from the 
central administration. However, the lack of EU pre-accession aid, and the 
prospect of future structural funding would decrease the domestic incitement for 
reform and regional decentralization. This would slow down the speed of 
decentralization. Since there were no traditions of actual regional self-governance 
it is not likely that the regions would have been established within a foreseeable 
future without pressures from the outside. As it turned out one of the strongest 
points of reference for the domestic advocates of decentralization was in fact the 
European Model, notwithstanding that this model hardly existed as an empirical 
phenomenon, but it certainly existed, albeit as a somehow moving target, in the 
accession requirements for the Czechs and other CEECs. 
 
Whether the regions that the Constitution anticipated, would have been 
established in a more distant future is hard to predict. But in fact another European 
process pulling in the direction of decentralized democratic self-government, 
might have affected the Czech stance on the longer playing field: The Congress of 
Local and Regional Authorities in Europe (CLRAE), is an institution under the 
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purely inter-governmental organization the Council of Europe. The members of 
the Congress are locally and regionally elected politicians and they focus very 
much on the conditions for local and regional democracy in the member states, 
which comprise countries from the entire European Continent. If there are 
reasonable doubts about a member state’s compliance with the provisions of the 
European Charter of Local Self-Government and the draft European Charter of 
Regional Self-Government the Congress sends out rapporteurs to draw up reports 
evaluating the conditions for local and regional democracy in relation to the 
charters. In 2000 the Congress actually evaluated the conditions for local and 
regional democracy in the Czech Republic in a report that basically praised the 
Czech Republic for the efforts already done in direction of a strengthening the 
local and regional democracy, but also recommended that the efforts were 
reinforced (CLRAE 2000). If however the processes of reforming the Czech 
regional policies had not already been sped up at this point, it is most likely that 
this report would have been more critical, and that it would have been followed up 
by a range of harsh resolutions putting pressure on the Czech government to 
change its policies and live up to the obligations under the two charters. Albeit 
more soft, the pressure that stems from international attention to an issue would 
maybe in a longer time perspective provide opportunities for national actors, or 
alter the preferences, ideas and collective understandings about good governance 
and appropriate behaviour, in order to facilitate a change of direction in the Czech 
regional policies. But, as it has turned out the EU has provided the main pressure 
and the main incentive to change the Czech regional policies. In this way it would 
probably be a more fair presentation to characterize the observed process as one of 
EU-isation, but as the construction of Europe is today and following the trends of 
the literature on the subject it is safe to call it Europeanization. 
5.3 Conclusion 
The cardinal question that we have tried to explore in this report was: 
 
How has the regional policies in the Czech Republic been affected by 
Europeanization and to what extent have domestic factors mediated the outcome 
of the transformation processes? 
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On the background of our analyses we can conclude that Europeanization has 
indeed affected the Czech regional policies, mainly by applying direct pressure on 
the Czech government to adjust its regional policies to the requirements of the 
criteria for membership and pre-accession aid. Domestic factors have played a 
decisive role in the outcome of the Europeanization processes through the policy 
preferences of strong domestic actors in the central government. But, the change 
of government and the increase in EU-pressure meant that the reform processes 
gained momentum. Which in turn meant that the domestic mediating factors 
started to work in favour of EU-initiated reforms and the regional policy was 
Europeanized with the consent of central actors in the Czech Republic. 
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Appendix 
Timelinie over key events in the Czech Republic and the EU 
1989 
– 17th November  – Student march and The Velvet Revolution 
– 3rd December  – The resignation of the communist party 
– Creating of the Phare Programme by the EU Commission 
– December Vaclav Klaus appointed Minister of Finance 
– 29th December  – Vaclav Havel elected as President         
1990 
– 8th June - first democratic election in 42 years – Vaclav Havel re-elected 
as President 
– Regions abolished by the government Prime Minister Petr Pithart  
1991 
– Pre-Accession Aid begins with the Phare funding from the EU 
– Census, 1.4 million inhabitants preferred nationality of either Moravia or 
Silesia to nationality of the Czech Republic. 
– December Fall of the Soviet Union 
1992 
– 2nd July -Vaclav Klaus elected as Prime Minister of the Czechoslovakian 
Republic 
– 20th July – Vaclav Havel resign as President for the Czechoslovakian 
Republic, partly due to Slovakian pressure. 
– 16th December - the Czech Constitution is ratified 
1993 
– 1st January - Velvet Divorce, bloodless spilt-up of the Czechoslovakian 
republic, the New Czech Constitution takes effect, Vaclav Klaus take 
office as the first Prime Minister of the Czech Republic 
– 2nd February - Vaclav Havel elected as the first Czech President 
– 21st-22nd June - European Council in Copenhagen, the Copenhagen 
Criteria for accession of the CEECs into the EU is drawn up. 
– European Union signs Europe Agreements with the Czech Republic 
1994 
–  
1995 
– Admitted to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)  
1996 
– 17th January - Czech Republic’s formal application for membership of 
the EU is handed in to the Commission 
– June - Vaclav Klaus reappointed as Prime Minister  
– 1st November - Establishment of Czech Ministry of Regional 
Development (MRD) 
1997 
– Reform of the Phare programme by the EU Commission  
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– 15th July - report from the EU Commission ‘Opinion on the Czech 
Republic’s application for EU membership’   
– November – The Sarajevo Assassination, the Fall of the Klaus 
Government due to corruption allegations. 
– 17th December - Josef Tošovský appointed as temporary Prime Minister 
– December – adoption of ‘Constitutional Act on the Formation of the 
Regions’ which eventually led to the creation of 14 self- governing 
regional authorities      
1998 
– January - Vaclav Havel re-elected as president 
– March - Commitment by the CZ government to adaptation of the acquis 
– Accession Partnership Agreement 
– April - Alignment of regional policy with the principles of EU structural 
policy 
– 19th June General election won by CSSD   
– 17th July - Miloš Zeman appointed as Prime Minister 
– 13th October First Regular Report from the Commission 
1999 
– Establishment of a Regional Development Strategy 
– 12th March - Czech Republic member of NATO 
– 13th October - Regular Report from the EU Commission 
– 27th October – First National Development Plan resolution no.1190/1999 
was created 
– December The Accession Partnership-agreement amended 
2000 
– 1st January - Czech legislation on the establishment of the Regions 
supposed to take affect but postponed due to slow approval procedures 
of the legislation. 
– April - negotiations on Acquis chapter 21 is opened between the Czech 
Republic and the Commission 
– June - Regional Development Act established 
– November Accession Partnership-agreement amended   
– 8th November - Regular Report from the EU Commission 
– 12th November - first election for the councils of the 14 regional bodies. 
2001 
– 1st January - The 14 new regional authorities becomes a reality 
– June - updated version of the National Development Plan resolution 
no.470/2001 delivered to the EU Commission 
– 13th November - Regular Report from the EU Commission 
2002 
– April - Czech Republic close negotiations on Acquis chapter 21  
– Accession Partnership-agreement has been amended 
– 14th June General election won by the CSSD  
– 12th July – Vladimir Spindla elected as Prime Minister  
– 9th October - Regular Report from the EU Commission 
– 13th December - Copenhagen Council, negotiations on all 31 Acquis 
chapters is concluded with the Czech Republic and the EU formally 
invites Czech Republic to Join the European Union 
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2003 
– Monitoring report from the EU Commission  
– 7th March - former Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus elected president 
– 16th April - Czech Republic sign the Treaty of Accession 
– 13-14th June - The voters of the Czech Republic approve the Treaty of 
Accession at a referendum, with a 55% turnout, 77,3% of the votes are in 
favour of membership. 
– 5th November - Regular Report from the EU Commission 
2004 
– 1st May – the Czech Republic joins the EU 
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